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Abstract. Soft law consist of rules issued by law-making bodies that do not comply with
procedural formalities necessary to give the rules legal status yet nonetheless may influence the
behavior of other law-making bodies and of the public. Soft law has been much discussed in the
literatures on international law, constitutional law, and administrative law, yet congressional
soft-lawmaking, such as the congressional resolution, has received little attention. Congressional
soft law affects behavior by informing the public and political institutions about the intentions
and policy preferences of Congress, which are informative about future hard law as well as of
Congress’s view of the world, and thus relevant to the decision-making of various political
agents as well as that of the public. Congressional soft law is important for a range of topics,
including statutory interpretation and constitutional development. Other types of soft law—
international, constitutional, and judicial—are compared.
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INTRODUCTION
Soft law is all the rage these days. In constitutional law, a deluge of recent
scholarship argues that the “small c” constitution of unwritten norms is at least as
important as the “big C” written and judicially developed Constitution.1 Scholars have
devoted increasing attention to “the constitution outside the constitution”—extraconstitutional or sub-constitutional norms, especially those developed by non-judicial
agents such as legislatures.
In international law, too, scholars have turned their attention from the traditional
manifestations of international law—treaties, judicial opinions, government
announcements—to what they have also called soft law.2 Soft international law includes

1

See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside the Constitution, 117 YALE L.J. 408 (2007); BRUCE
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991); William N. Eskridge, Jr., & John Ferejohn, SuperStatutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215 (2001); Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Constitutional Showdowns, U. PA.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2008) (discussing the way confrontations between branches generate constitutional
development); Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Hardball, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 523 (2004) (distinguishing
constitutional and pre-constitutional understandings); Sanford Levinson & Jack Balkin, Three Types of
Constitutional Crisis, unpub. m.s. (2007) (examining the relationship between constitutional crises and
constitutional development); Jon Elster, Unwritten Constitutional Norms, unpub. m.s. (2007) (describing
binding constitutional norms that do not appear in the written constitution). The idea is not new; see, e.g.,
Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703 (1975).
2

See, e.g., Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, 54
INT’L ORG. 421 (2000) (providing a typology and general analysis); Daniel E. Ho, Compliance and
International Soft Law: Why Do Countries Implement the Basle Accord, 5 J. INT’L ECON. L. 647 (2002)
(providing empirical evidence that many states, especially democracies, comply with the Basle Accord,
even though this instrument is not legally binding); COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF
NONBINDING NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM (Dinah Shelton ed. 2000) (case studies of
compliance with nonlegal norms); Charles Lipson, Why Are Some International Agreements Informal?, 45
INT’L ORG. 495 (1991) (arguing that informal agreements can be negotiated more quickly, are more
flexible, require less information, and can avoid publicity, but provide less of a commitment, than legal
agreements); JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 91-100 (2005)
(discussing differences in domestic effects of the two types of law); ROBERT SCOTT & PAUL B. STEPHAN,
THE LIMITS OF LEVIATHAN 110-20 (2006) (arguing that soft-law-style informal cooperation sometimes is
possible when formal agreements are not).
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non-binding declarations such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and General
Assembly resolutions. Despite their lack of formal legal status, these materials can
ultimately have real effect—by working their way into customary international law or by
providing the framework for informal inter-state cooperation.3 Soft law in international
relations, like small-c constitutional law, consists of norms that affect the behavior of
agents, even though the norms do not have the status of formal law.
Or consider the recent controversy about presidential signing statements.4 When
Congress presents a bill to the President for signature, the President often issues a signing
statement that interprets some of the bill’s provisions.5 Signing statements are not binding
law, but many people believe that they do, or should, influence courts and agencies when
these bodies interpret statutes. If signing statements affect the beliefs of private parties
about how the President will execute the law, signing statements might affect private
behavior. Thus, signing statements, although lacking formal legal power, could have an
effect similar to that of the other forms of soft law.
The controversy about signing statements mirrors an older dispute about other
soft-law practices in the executive branch. Agencies frequently issue statements of “best
practices,” which may induce voluntary compliance by regulated parties.6 Critics
complain that administrative agencies produce too much policy through informal and
non-binding guidance documents or policy statements in order to avoid costs associated
with formal mechanisms like notice and comment rulemaking or formal adjudication.7
For example, suppose a statute requires that wild animals be contained by fences that are
“structurally sound.”8 An agency might use notice and comment proceedings to issue a
formal rule interpreting the phrase “structurally sound” to require a fence taller than eight
feet. Alternatively, the agency might issue a guidance document stating that the agency
understands the statute to so require and pronouncing that the agency intends to enforce
the statute only against owners with fences less than eight feet high. This statement has
no formal legal force; the agency must still defend its interpretation of the statute in an
3

See Ho, supra note 2 (providing empirical evidence for the Basle Accords).

4

See Curtis A. Bradley & Eric A. Posner, Presidential Signing Statements and Executive Power, 23
CONST. COMMENTARY 307 (2006). William D. Popkin, Judicial Use of Presidential Legislative History: A
Critique, 66 IND. L.J. 699 (1991). Kristy L. Carroll, Comment, Whose Statute Is It Anyway?: Why and How
Courts Should Use Presidential Signing Statements When Interpreting Federal Statutes, 46 CATH. U.L.
REV. 475 (1997). Christopher N. May, Presidential Defiance of “Unconstitutional“ Laws: Reviving the
Royal Prerogative, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 865 (1994). See also Presidential Signing Statements: A
Different Kind of Line Item Veto, in BY ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT: THE USE AND ABUSE OF EXECUTIVE
DIRECT ACTION (Philip J. Cooper, ed. 2002).
5

Neil Kinkopf & Peter Shane, Signed Under Protest: A Database of Presidential Signing Statements,
2001-2006 (unpublished manuscript 2007) (assembling collection of Presidential signing statements).
6

See David Zaring, Best Practices, 81 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 294, 307-13 (2006) (discussing trend towards best
practices in agency actions in past decade)

7

See generally John Manning, Nonlegislative Rules, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 893, 914-17 (2004)
(discussing doctrine governing what type of rules must be issued using procedural formality); Peter L.
Strauss, The Rulemaking Continuum, 41 DUKE L.J. 1463, 1464 (1992) (same).

8

See Jacob E. Gersen, Legislative Rules Revisited, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1705 (2007) (discussing Hoctor v.
U.S. Department of Agriculture, 82 F.3d 165 (7th Cir. 1996)).
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enforcement proceeding or litigation. Nonetheless, many regulated parties will simply
construct a fence to comply.
To the private law scholar, soft law might not seem as exotic as it does in these
other fields. A judicial opinion contains a holding that has binding legal effect and
reasoning that, in the case of some higher courts, might also have binding effect. But
generally speaking, the reasoning in judicial opinions is only “dicta”: it does not have
binding force. And yet clearly dicta have a great deal of importance, influencing the
decisionmaking of subsequent courts9 and hence people who bring their behavior in line
with predictions of how courts will act.
As a final example, also from private law, consider the ubiquitous presence of
non-binding instruments in commercial relations. A letter of intent, for example, signals
that two parties have an interest in further negotiations leading up to a binding contract
but rarely has legal force itself.10 It is clear that such “soft contracts” have commercial
importance and affect the behavior of the parties that enter them.11
The academic literatures on these topics have different concerns, yet the themes
are similar. Soft law refers to statements by law-making authorities that do not have the
force of law (most often because they do not comply with relevant formalities), but
nonetheless affect the behavior of others either because (1) others take the statements as
credible expressions of policy judgments or intentions that, at some later point, might be
embodied in formally binding law and reflected in the coercive actions of executive
agents, or (2) because the statements provide epistemic guidance about how the
authorities see the world.12 Individuals, governments, states, and other agents use soft law
in order to enter commitments and influence behavior where legal mechanisms are
regarded as undesirable.
Against this backdrop, it is a puzzle that no parallel literature has emerged in the
field of legislation and legislative process.13 One does not have to look hard to find a
9

Cf. Ethan Bueno de Mesquita & Matthew Stephenson, Informative Precedent and Intrajudicial
Communication, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 755 (2002).
10

See, e.g., Empro v. Ball-Co, 870 F.2d 423 (7th Cir. 1989).

11

See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the
Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992).

12

The final example, involving private contracting, does not involve law-making authorities except in the
metaphorical but usefully analogous sense that private parties can make “law” for themselves by entering
contracts.
13

The closest work focuses on the “expressive functions” of law, which focuses on the communicative
impact of hard law. See, e.g., Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L.
REV. 1649, 1652 (2000) (arguing law can provide a resolution to coordination problems by specifying a
focal point); Dhammika Dharmapala & Richard H. McAdams, The Condorcet Jury Theorem and the
Expressive Function of Law: A Theory of Informative Law, 5 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1 (2003) (formal law
serves expressive functions, revealing information about legislative information); Robert Cooter, Do Good
Laws Make Good Citizens? An Economic Analysis of Internalized Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1577, 1598
(2000); Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585, 595 (1998); Cass R.
Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2029-31 (1996); ERIC A. POSNER,
LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS (2000). For an overview, see Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A
Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1363 (2000).
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similar form of soft law: the congressional resolution. Congressional resolutions—
whether concurrent or one-house—generally have no formal legal effect.14 Periodically,
proposals surface to pay more attention to the resolution as a mechanism for influencing
statutory interpretation,15 foreign policy,16 or some other external matter. Yet the soft
statute has received little attention in scholarly work on legislation.17 The conventional
wisdom is that such measures lack importance because they do not create binding legal
obligations.18 They are cheap and often happy talk by legislatures, commending military
officers for good service, or sports teams for winning championships.
In fact, many congressional resolutions are very serious: they assert controversial
foreign policy judgments, urge the President to intervene in humanitarian crises or to
avoid a military conflict, criticize allies and enemies, forecast plans for taxation and
regulation, send signals to regulatory agencies about Congress’s expectations, criticize
the President’s interpretations of executive power, advance interpretations of
constitutional provisions and statutes, urge state and local governments to take action to
address local problems, identify public health problems that need funding, and much
more.19 Statutory soft law deserves more attention than it has received, especially in light
of the large cognate literatures that examine the workings of soft law in other fields. In
the course of analyzing congressional resolutions and other forms of legislative soft
law—including hortatory statutes—we will advance a general theory that explains the
attractiveness of soft law, its advantages and disadvantages, and its place in our
constitutional order. We will show that soft public law is preferable to hard public law in
identifiable cases and contexts.
The congressional resolution is essentially a “soft statute”—a device for
communicating the policy views and intentions of one or both houses of Congress.
Legislative soft law communicates congressional intentions more accurately and cheaply
than does a regular statute, which, in order to avoid a veto, will usually reflect the views
14

There are familiar exceptions. Consider, for example, the Senate’s approval of treaties, the approval of
proposed constitutional amendments, and the decision to impeach by the House.

15

Ronald M. Gibson, Congressional Concurrent Resolutions as an Aid to Statutory Interpretation, 37
A.B.A. L.J. 421 (1951).

16

See, e.g., Doyle W. Buckwalter, The Congressional Concurrent Resolution: A Search for Foreign Policy
Influence, 14 MIDWEST J. POL. SCI. 434, 442-44 (1970) (arguing that the concurrent resolution is often used
by Congress to attempt to influence foreign policy).

17

But see GABRIELE GANZ, QUASI-LEGISLATION: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN SECONDARY LEGISLATION
(1987). Ganz surveys the use of extra-statutory codes of practice, circulars, and guidelines in the United
Kingdom. She argues that quasi-legislation can be an effective way of regulating behavior when there is
already consensus; they play a coordination role. See id. at 51-55. Although Ganz has a somewhat different
set of non-statutory law in mind, she draws a parallel distinction between quasi-legislation aimed at private
parties and quasi-legislation aimed at other public entities, id. at 68-70, that we develop here. Our
theoretical apparatus differs in that we emphasize the informational effects of soft statutes, or non-statutes
in her terms. Her view parallels the coordination arguments about expressive hard law, supra.
18

See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 56 (1986) (“A concurrent resolution, in contrast, makes no
binding policy; it is a means of expressing fact, principles, opinions, and purposes of the two Houses”)
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

19

We discuss examples, infra.
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of the President as well. Legislative soft law communicates the views of a chamber or the
Congress more accurately than do statements of individual legislators, whose views will
often diverge from that of the majority. These communications can influence the
behavior of the public and of other political institutions.
There are three main mechanisms for influence. First, a congressional
communication affects people’s beliefs about how Congress will (formally) regulate in
the future, to the extent that it credibly reveals the political preferences of Congress (or its
members or a substantial coalition of its members or its leadership, etc.). A soft statute
thus anticipates a hard statute, but when the target audience reacts appropriately to the
soft statute, the hard statute may become unnecessary. Second, a congressional
communication has a purely epistemic effect. Information about Congress’s views might
cause people to change their beliefs about the state of the world.20 Third, in some settings
other institutions that generate formal law take legislative views as an input. Agencies,
courts, and the President regularly incorporate legislative views as one of many factors in
the construction of binding policy.
Part I defines soft law and distinguishes it from related concepts. Part II explains
how legislative soft law affects behavior. Part III discusses applications of the theory to
the public, the President, and administrative agencies. Part IV discusses the implications
of the theory for courts, focusing on statutory interpretation and constitutional
adjudication. Part V offers a general theory of soft law, linking our analysis of soft
statutes with soft constitutional law, soft international law, and other fields. We hope to
stimulate thinking about the role of informal or non-legal behavior in law-making
institutions—a public law analogue to the private-law focused literature on law and social
norms.21
I. SOFT LEGISLATIVE LAW
We define soft law as a rule issued by a law-making authority that does not
comply with constitutional and other formalities that are necessary for the rule to be
legally binding. We define hard law as a rule issued by a law-making authority that does
comply with constitutional and other formalities that are necessary for the rule to be
legally binding. The law-making body uses soft law because the hard-law approach has
disadvantages; sometimes, but not always, soft law will produce the same behavioral
effects that an otherwise equivalent hard law would have produced; at other times, soft
law might have more desirable consequences than the nearest hard-law equivalent would.
A. Hard Statutes
Article I, sec. 7 of the U.S. Constitution requires that a bill be approved by both
houses of Congress (bicameralism) and signed by the President (presentment).22 The
Supreme Court has rejected many schemes that deviate from this “finely wrought

20

Cf. Dharmapala & McAdams, supra note 13 (discussing expressive effects of hard law).

21

See ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991); ERIC A.
POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS (2002).
22

U.S. Const. Art. I, sec. 7.
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procedure.”23 However, congressional pronouncements can become the law of the land in
other ways as well. Treaties are approved by two thirds of the Senate.24 Bills vetoed by
the President nonetheless become law if approved by two thirds of the House and the
Senate.25 In these latter cases, however, the law still satisfies the relevant procedural
requirements. In most cases, compliance with these formalities distinguishes hard statutes
from soft statutes. However, we will discuss some ambiguous cases below.
B. Soft Statutes
Soft statutes do not meet the formal requirements for duly enacted legislation, but
nonetheless may affect behavior. Two prime examples of soft legislation, and the ones on
which we focus, are the simple resolution and the concurrent resolution.26 A simple
resolution is a resolution passed by a majority of one house of Congress.27 Concurrent
resolutions are approved by majorities of both houses of Congress.28 Resolutions are used
for a remarkably varied assortment of activities. A non-exclusive list from recent
congresses includes: (1) foreign policy judgments (for example, urging the European
Union to maintain an arms embargo on China,29 calling on the President to recognize
Armenian genocide30); (2) urging revision of administrative regulations affecting such
activities as industrial truck operator training31 labeling of clothing,32 and the distribution
of resources held for disaster relief;33 (3) low-cost symbolic interest group payoffs
(celebrating cancer awareness month); (4) empty happy talk (congratulating a college
football team for winning the championship); and (5) administrative acts and
housekeeping.34 Resolutions from earlier congresses are similar.

23

See, e.g., Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 440 (1998) (line item veto) (“What has emerged in
these cases from the President’s exercise of his statutory cancellation powers, however, are truncated
versions of two bills that passed both Houses of Congress. They are not the product of the ‘finely wrought’
procedure that the Framers designed.”); I.NS. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983) (legislative veto) (“It
emerges clearly that the prescription for legislative action in Art. I, §§ 1, 7 represents the Framers' decision
that the legislative power of the Federal government be exercised in accord with a single, finely wrought
and exhaustively considered, procedure.”).

24

U.S. Const. Art. II, sec. 2.

25

U.S. Const. Art. I, sec. 7.

26

As distinguished from the joint resolution, which is presented to the President just like a bill.

27

Howard White, The Concurrent Resolution in Congress, 35 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 886, 886-87 (1941)
(discussing history of concurrent resolutions).

28

Senate Rule VII, Paragraph 1; L. DESCHLER, DESCHLER’S PRECEDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES HOUSE
ch. 24, sec. 5, at 4801 (1974).

OF REPRESENTATIVES,
29

See S. Res. 91, 109th Cong., 1st Sess. (March 17, 2005).

30

See S. Res. 320, 109th Cong., 1st Sess. (Nov. 15, 2005).

31

See S. Con. Res. 17, 103d Cong; H. Con. Res. 92, 103d Cong. (1994).

32

See H. Con. Res. 80, 105th Cong, 1st Sess. (May 15, 1997) (discussed at 62 Fed. Reg. 63756).

33

See S. Con. Res. 63 (June 12, 1996); see also Flood Compensation Program, 64 Fed. Reg. 47352.

34

For example, adjournment is accomplished via resolution as is adoption of the House Rules to govern the
session.
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Congress agrees to a few dozen concurrent resolutions per year; each house
agrees to a few hundred simple resolutions per year. Most of the concurrent resolutions
fall into categories (3), (4), and (5); only a few express important sentiments, usually
regarding foreign policy. The same is true for the House’s simple resolutions. However,
the Senate agrees to many, sometimes dozens of, significant simple resolutions in the first
two categories.
Consider some recent proposed and agreed-to resolutions from 2007. One
resolution expresses “disapproval of the Indiana Department of Environmental
Management’s issuance of a permit allowing BP to increase their daily dumping of
ammonia and total suspended solids into lake Michigan”35 and urges Indiana to
reconsider the issuance.36 Another resolution states that
it is the goal of the United States that, not later than January 1, 2025, the
agricultural, forestry, and working land of the United States should
provide from renewable resources not less than 25 percent of the total
energy consumed in the United States and continue to produce safe,
abundant, and affordable food, feed, and fiber.37
A third states that there should be an expansion of the program under which state and
local law enforcement authorities arrest aliens who have violated U.S. law and
encourages the Secretary of Homeland Security to ensure expedited consideration of a
border fence.38 Finally, the Iraq War Policy Resolution expresses the sense of Congress
that United States should not deepen its military involvement in Iraq and specified goals
for the ongoing mission.39
35

H. Con. Res. 187, 110th Cong., 1st Sess. (July 25, 2007).

36

Id.

37

S. Con. Res. 3, 110th Cong., 1st Sess. (introduced Jan. 17, 2007).

38

H. Con. Res. 218, 110th Cong., 1st Sess. (introduced Sept. 24, 2007) (“Expresses the sense of Congress
that: (1) Congress should verify that current immigration and border security laws are enforced; (2) the
Secretary of Homeland Security should ensure the expedited construction of the border fence; (3) a report
required by the Secretary concerning progress made toward achieving and maintaining operational control
over the international border should include recommendations to enhance U.S. national security on the
northern border and emphasize the Administration’s commitment to protecting both the southern and
northern borders; (4) Congress should fully fund the 18,000 Border Patrol agents currently authorized; and
(5) there should be an expansion of the program under which state and local law enforcement authorities
investigate, detain, and arrest aliens who have violated U.S. law.”).

39

See S. Con. Res. 2., 110th Cong., Iraq War Policy Resolution. Reported to the Senate amended (Jan. 24,
2007) (“Expresses the sense of Congress that: (1) it is not in the U.S. national interest to deepen its military
involvement in Iraq, particularly by increasing the U.S. military presence in Iraq; (2) the primary objective
of U.S. strategy in Iraq should be to have the Iraqi political leaders make the political compromises
necessary to end the violence in Iraq; (3) greater regional and international support would assist the Iraqis
in achieving a political solution and national reconciliation; (4) main elements of U.S. forces in Iraq should
transition to helping ensure Iraq’s territorial integrity, conduct counterterrorism activities, reduce regional
interference in Iraq’s internal affairs, and accelerate training of Iraqi troops; (5) the United States should
transfer, under an appropriately expedited timeline, responsibility for internal security and halting sectarian
violence in Iraq to the government of Iraq and Iraqi security forces; and (6) the United States should engage
nations in the Middle East to develop a regional, internationally-sponsored peace and reconciliation process
for Iraq.”).
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These four statements provide important information to affected parties.
Factories, municipalities, and residents living along the Great Lakes will make
investments with an eye to possible congressional regulation in the future. So will the
energy industry and people who live along the borders. The Iraq resolution signaled to
the President that congressional and public support for the Iraq intervention had waned.
C. Ambiguous or Excluded Categories
1. Procedural Rules
The Rules of Procedure in the House and the Senate are a hybrid of soft and hard
law. Because the House and Senate Rules are enacted pursuant to established procedural
formalities, they meet our definition of hard law. However, they do not have formal legal
effect outside the legislature: they are not judicially enforceable and they are not regarded
as binding law by other legal authorities. In this way, congressional rules resemble soft
law. Because others have discussed procedural rules,40 we do not discuss them. This
limitation makes an already unwieldy topic more tractable. We emphasize soft law that
regulates external behavior rather than the decisionmaking of government bodies.41
2. Resolutions Given Legal Effect by Prior Statutes
Sometimes a congressional enactment does not meet the formal procedural
requirements for legislation, but is given formal legal effect because of a prior duly
enacted law. The legislative veto, for example, allows one or two houses of Congress to
override or veto a policy decision of the executive branch or administrative agency by
using a simple or concurrent resolution.42 The negative legislative veto allows policy to
be implemented unless Congress disapproves; the positive legislative veto forbids policy
to be implemented unless Congress approves ex post.43 The Supreme Court has held a
negative one house legislative veto unconstitutional, and its reasoning implied that the
positive legislative and/or two-house veto might be unconstitutional as well.44 A related
40

See generally Adrian Vermeule, The Constitutional Law of Congressional Procedure, 71 U. CHI. L. REV.
361 (2004) (collecting constitutional rules that regulate internal congressional practice).
41

We also exclude framework or procedural statutes that are duly enacted and therefore formally legally
binding, but do not directly regulate external behavior. Instead, like internal rules, they regulate Congress’s
internal business. The most prominent examples are framework statutes. See generally Elizabeth Garrett,
The Purposes of Framework Legislation, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL. ISSUES. 717 (2005); William N. Eskridge,
Jr., America’s Statutory “Constitution,” 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 7-9 (2007); Ernest A. Young, Toward a
Framework Statute for Supranational Adjudication, 57 EMORY L.J. (2007).
42

See generally BARBARA HINKSON CRAIG, THE LEGISLATIVE VETO: CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL
REGULATION (1983); JOHN R. BOLTON, THE LEGISLATIVE VETO: UNSEPARATING THE POWERS (1977).
43

OF

See, e.g., Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, § 351, 76 Stat. 872, 899, 19 U.S.C. §
1981(a) (requiring concurrent resolution to approve of Tariff Commission recommended tariffs or duties);
Export-Import Bank Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-646, § 8, 88 Stat. 2333, 2336, 12 U.S.C. §
625(e) (requiring concurrent resolution to approve of Presidential limitations for exports to the USSR);
Energy Conservation and Production Act, Pub. L. No. 94-385, § 305, 90 Stat. 1125, 1148 (1976), 42 U.S.C.
§ 6834 (requiring sanctions involving federal assistance performance standards for new buildings to be
approved by resolution of both Houses). For more examples, see the appendix in I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462
U.S. 919 (1983) (holding the one-house legislative veto unconstitutional).

44

I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
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mechanism permits Congress to use a resolution to terminate a prior statutory delegation
of authority to the President.45 The legislative veto and related mechanisms are soft
statutes in the sense that they do not satisfy the bicameralism and presentment
requirements. But they are hard law because a prior duly enacted statute grants formal
legal effect to the simple or concurrent resolution.
3. Bill Introduction and Other Internal Actions and Statements
It is tempting to say that the soft statute is similar to the introduction of a bill.
Bills are introduced constantly in both houses. Most are never passed; on some, no action
is taken at all. At the same time, the introduction of a bill might reveal information about
congressional preferences, and in this way may be functionally similar to a soft statute—
weaker but still informative. A similar argument could be made about other statements
that are made in a legislative session—speeches on the floor, statements made at
oversight hearings, reports, and so on. As we will argue in Part II.C, however, these types
of statements will rarely have much credibility. In addition, they have been extensively
discussed in the literature on legislative interpretation. For these reasons, we will not
discuss them except in passing.
4. Ambiguously Worded Statutes
International relations scholars sometimes classify ambiguous treaties as soft law.
Whatever the merits of this judgment for understanding international relations,46 we
adopt a different approach in our analysis of statutes. American courts almost always
enforce ambiguous statutes, using canons of interpretation to clarify the meanings of
those statutes. These statutes thus are lawfully binding. In rare cases, courts refuse to
enforce ambiguous statutes. In administrative law, for example, the nondelegation
doctrine—to the extent that it remains valid law47—prohibits Congress from granting
authority to executive agencies without an “intelligible principle” to guide them. In
extreme cases where statutes are unenforceable because they are ambiguous, it might
make sense to classify them as soft law, but their very ambiguity also means that they can
have little effect on people’s behavior, as no one can know what they mean. For this
reason, we will exclude ambiguous statutes from the category of soft law as well.
5. Hortatory Statutes
By contrast, there are numerous statutes that are absolutely clear and that satisfy
the procedural requirements for legislation, but that also have no formal legal effect
because the statute, by its terms, provides that the rules it sets down cannot be enforced,
or because Congress refuses to appropriate funds to enforce them.48 For example, the
45

See, e.g., Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, 56 Stat. 767; Allen v. Grand Central Aircraft Co., 347
U.S. 535, 541-42 (1954) (discussing this legislation); United States v. Moore, 340 U.S. 606 (1951)
(discussing use of concurrent resolution as a condition subsequent for termination of legislation).
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For criticism, see Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 2, at 91-100.
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See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1721,
1740 (2002).
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For discussions of “symbolic” statutes, see, e.g., Mark Tushnet & Larry Yackle, Symbolic Statutes and
Real Laws: the Pathologies of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty and the Prison Litigation
Reform Act, 47 DUKE L.J. 1, 74-76 (comparing instrumental, expressive, and symbolic statutes); John P.
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Supreme Court interpreted the weak language in The Developmentally Disabled
Assistance and Bill of Rights Act as intending “to encourage, rather than mandate, the
provision of better services to the developmentally disabled.”49 In another case, the Court
noted that “Congress sometimes legislates by innuendo, making declarations of policy
and indicating a preference while requiring measures that, though falling short of
legislating its goals, serve as a nudge in the preferred directions.”50 Weak fair housing
laws were sometimes said to be hortatory pronouncements with extremely weak
enforcement mechanisms.51 Before the courts interpreted the National Environmental
Policy Act to impose procedural burdens on agencies, the command to “consider”
environmental impact was thought to impose no enforceable obligations.52 Consider also
statutes that create voluntary regulatory programs.53 These hortatory statutes are hard law
under our definition because they satisfy procedural requirements; however, because they
have no binding legal effect, they resemble soft law.
6. Substantively Unconstitutional Statutes
Many other statutes satisfy the bicameralism and presentment requirements, and
other procedural formalities, but they are “substantively” unconstitutional—they violate
the First Amendment or due process requirements or exceed the scope of Congress’s
delegated powers, or run afoul of other constitutional rules. We will treat these statutes as
hard statutes because, in the usual case, Congress seeks to achieve a legal effect but is
thwarted by the courts or the constitution. However, in some cases Congress might enact
a statute that it expects to be struck down, in the hope of achieving soft-law style
effects—sending a signal to the courts that their jurisprudence conflicts with public
values or to dissenting members of the public that their behavior violates fundamental
social norms. The Flag Protection Act of 1989, struck down by the Supreme Court in
United States v. Eichman,54 is a law of this sort. The Act was passed after the Supreme
Court held flag burning a form of protected speech in Texas v. Johnson.55 In addition,
many statutes are non-justiciable: courts refuse to hear the merits of cases brought under
them because they believe the statutes implicate political questions such as the balance of

Dwyer, The Pathology of Symbolic Legislation, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 233 (1990) (criticizing symbolic
statutes); Lawrence Friedman, Legal Rules and Social Change, 19 STAN. L. REV. 786, 846 (1967).
49

See Pennhurst State School v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 20 (1981).

50

See Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 413 (1970).

51

Duane Lockard, The Politics of Antidiscrimination Legislation, 3 HARV. J. LEGIS. 3 (1965).

52

See John H. Barton, Behind the Legal Explosion, 27 STAN. L. REV. 567, 579 (1975); ROBERT G. DREHER,
THE POLITICAL ASSAULT ON THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT (2005).
53

See generally Sophia Hsia, Foreign Direct Investment and the Environment: Are Voluntary Codes of
Conduct and Self-Imposed Standards Enough? 9 ENV. LAW. 673 (2003).

54

496 U.S. 310 (1990).

55

491 U.S. 397 (1989).
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power between the legislative and executive branches. The War Powers Act, which
regulates the executive’s use of military force, is one such example.56
II. HOW DOES SOFT LAW AFFECT BEHAVIOR?
We propose two main theories for the use of soft statutes in particular and soft
law in general. First, Congress or another law-making body uses soft law to convey
information about future intentions to enact hard law, allowing people to adjust their
behavior in advance of binding statutes and in some cases avoiding constitutional
requirements that apply to hard law. As we will show, soft law can be useful in this way
even when the anticipated hard-law successor never materializes: if people adjust their
behavior in anticipation of hard law, hard law enactment might not be necessary.57
Second, Congress uses soft law to convey information about its beliefs about the
state of the world—both factual and normative beliefs. The Armenian genocide
resolution, for example, expressed the factual belief that the Armenian genocide actually
occurred—a historical event that is officially denied in Turkey—and the normative
beliefs that the Armenian genocide was wrong, rather than (as Turkey sometimes argues
in the alternative) an unfortunate but excusable incident to war. Congress’s beliefs about
states of the world may influence the beliefs of other people.
In both settings, soft law is a signal that provides information. Like other signals,
soft law can convey information more or less accurately and more or less efficiently. Soft
law is preferable to hard law when the signal conveys information more reliably or more
cheaply than hard law does. This Part surveys the relevant variables that affect the
direction and magnitude of these tradeoffs.
A. Soft Law as a Strategic Instrument
1. How Law Conveys Information
At first sight, it may seem that the difference between soft and hard statutes is
considerable. Hard statutes have the force of law; people comply with them in order to
avoid sanctions. Soft statutes do not, so people should not follow them. However, we can
profitably think about both types of statute in a different way. A regular statute is
essentially an act of communication that satisfies certain formal requirements set out in
the Constitution and embodied in tradition. By voting and satisfying other formalities,
Congress communicates to courts and other legal agents that certain behavior will now be
subjected to sanctions. The courts and other agents in turn interpret these
communications in light of specific disputes or factual settings, and issue orders to
56

War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973); see Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19 (D.C.
Cir. 2000). In principle, a rule can be hard law and non-justiciable: other agents regard the rule as legally
binding but courts do not enforce it. In the case of the War Powers Act, Presidents have generally declined
to say that they will not comply with it, preferring to interpret it narrowly in light of their constitutional
war-making powers.
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by serving as a focal point around which people coordinate. See McAdams, supra note 13. Soft statutes
could have the same effect; however, we have not found any examples of soft statutes that fit this model.
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another set of agents who have coercive powers—police officers, wardens, soldiers,
marshals. Thereupon these agents engage in the designated actions. Anticipating this
chain of events, most people engage in the desired behavior rather than risk sanctions.
The agents who receive this signal from Congress do not in any sense act
automatically. Indeed, agents often refuse to comply with Congress’s order. Most
commonly, judges refuse to order agents to comply with a regular statute that violates the
Constitution. Executive officials, in turn, will refuse to enforce the statute if judges forbid
them to. Less commonly, the President and executive agencies will refuse to follow or
enforce a statute if they believe that it violates the Constitution.58 Anticipating these
responses, many ordinary people might refuse to comply with the statute.
A soft statute also reveals legislative information. The relevant audience no longer
has a legal obligation to follow Congress’s order, but it may nonetheless change its
behavior. When parties change their behavior in response to soft law, it cannot be
because they fear immediate formal legal sanctions. Nonetheless, because soft law
reveals information about legislative beliefs, there are settings in which rational observers
will react as if it were hard law.
2. Theories of Communication
To explain the influence of soft statutes, we need a theory of how legislative
communication can influence behavior. Fortunately, there are many such theories, and we
draw on them below.
a. Signaling Theories
One theory is that Congress’s statement provides the addressee with information
about Congress’s goals or interests. If Congress says that it opposes the Iraq war, the
public learns that Congress disapproves of the Iraq war, or at least that it is more likely
that Congress disapproves of the war than would be the case if Congress did not make
this statement. The public might also learn more generally that Congress does not
approve of preventive or humanitarian wars. This information is useful, and it might
cause some members of the public to change their behavior. For example, investors might
be more reluctant to invest in firms that supply the military, and people who seek military
training but not combat experience might become more willing to join the army.
But why is Congress’s statement credible? Maybe Congress does not really mean
that it disapproves of the Iraq war, but is trying to obtain some short-term political
advantage by pandering to temporary passions. Perhaps the legislature is exploiting a
transient public mood in the hope of pressuring the President to yield in some other
political disputes between the two branches.
As a general matter, a statement is credible when it is accompanied by a costly
action—in particular, an action that is more costly for a dishonest speaker to engage in.59
Passing resolutions is costly: it takes time that could be used for other things—passing
58

See Walter Dellinger, Presidential Authority to Decline to Execute Unconstitutional Statutes, 18 OP. OFF.
LEGAL COUNSEL 199 (1994).
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Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 Q. J. ECON. 355, 361-62 (1973).
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legislation, engaging in constituent service, meeting supporters, enjoying leisure. These
other activities benefit members of Congress either directly or by improving their chances
for reelection. If Congress spends resources to enact a resolution disapproving the Iraq
War, observers will rationally infer that Congress cares more about this issue than it cares
about other issues for which it does not enact resolutions. In turn, people who are taking
actions with an eye toward how Congress might, in the future, regulate the Iraq
intervention or other military interventions would do well to take note of the resolution.
There is another signaling mechanism that can explain why soft statutes are
credible. Suppose that Congress can benefit from resolutions because they let the
President know Congress’s view on a particular issue—say, budgetary priorities. If the
President knows Congress’s view, he can take account of it when formulating a budget
prior to its submission to Congress. By doing so, the President can avoid a subsequent
budgetary impasse that hurts both him and Congress.60 Moreover, if the President takes
the soft statute seriously, then Congress thereby reduces the first-mover advantage
(however slight) that otherwise accrues from the President’s ability to propose an initial
budget.
Congress and the President engage in repeated play extending indefinitely into the
future. The President may well adopt the strategy of taking seriously Congress’s
resolutions as indications of Congress’s views only as long as Congress in fact acts
consistently with the resolutions when the budget is submitted. If Congress can commit
its members to act consistently with resolutions, then it benefits from having a reputation
for complying with its resolutions. The resolutions are credible; others, such as the
President, the courts, and the public, will believe them.
b. Cheap Talk Theories
Communication can be credible even when it is not costly, as long as certain other
conditions are satisfied. One such setting exists when parties face a coordination game,
where they both benefit by coordinating on a particular move.61 Suppose, for example,
that congressional leaders believe that Congress should strongly express a commitment to
human rights.62 The leaders believe that a concurrent resolution would receive more
publicity than a single-house resolution, and further that, given the legislature’s
opportunity costs, only one concurrent resolution on this topic is possible. Members of
Congress might be equally split as to whether to condemn the Armenian genocide or the
genocide in Darfur, but all agree or nearly all agree that condemning one genocide is
better than condemning none, and condemning both genocides is not politically possible
given time constraints and fears about diluting the message.
If one house goes first, then it can simply choose to condemn whichever genocide
that its members feel most strongly about. The other house, faced with the choice
between its first or second best outcome (passing an identical resolution), or muddying
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Cf. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 1.
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Fundamental Freedoms Positions, 94 Stat. 3672, H. Con. Res. 391 (Aug. 1, 1980).
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the message (passing a different resolution), which is its worst outcome, will join in the
concurrent resolution. The first house’s resolution is a credible statement of its members’
political preferences because those members anticipate the second house’s reaction, and
cannot benefit by that reaction if it misrepresents its preferences.
In a related model, a political agent must express its view about some issue, where
there are two separate audiences with conflicting political preferences.63 Suppose, for
example, that when Congress issues a condemnation of the Armenian genocide, the
relevant audience consists of Armenians and Armenian-Americans, on the one hand, and
Turkey and its American supporters, on the other hand. Assume that both groups have
political power and can punish members of Congress for adopting a resolution that they
disapprove. Here, when Congress condemns the Armenian genocide, it incurs a cost. This
cost comes from political pressure or loss of political opportunities from Turkey and its
supporters (including the U.S. military and businesses). Congress’s willingness to incur
this cost indicates that its support for Armenia is credible. Indeed, analytically this is very
similar to the signaling game: the cost is not intrinsic but nonetheless has the same effect
of producing credibility.
3. Implications
As long as Congress can credibly reveal its intentions with congressional
resolutions, it is likely that people’s behavior can be affected by these resolutions as well.
If resolutions reveal Congress’s policy views and hence the path of future legislation,
then potentially affected parties will adjust their behavior in light of their updated beliefs
about the legal environment in the future. Indeed, we have found a few examples where
soft statutes anticipate, and appear to cause, the adoption of voluntary codes of conduct.
The Recording Industry Association of America’s adoption of advertising guidelines for
notice of explicit lyrics64 after a congressional resolution urged a uniform labeling and
disclosure system.65 Colleges and universities adopted voluntary guidelines on illegal
file-sharing on university computer networks after congressional resolutions urged such
action.66 The decision of several major food companies to restrict advertising for “junk
food” during children’s television programs follows this pattern too.67 This way of
63

Joseph Farrell & Robert Gibbons, Cheap Talk with Two Audiences, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 1214 (1989); for
an overview, as applied to legislative process, see David Austen-Smith, Strategic Models of Talk in
Political Decision Making, 13 INT’L POLIT. SCI. REV. 45, 57 (1992).
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affecting behavior need not take the form of resolutions. Simple threats or promises from
congressional leaders or oversight committees can also do the trick, as others have
noted.68 But soft statutes, because they reflect the views of the entire body (a chamber, or
Congress as a whole), should be a particularly useful vehicle for accomplishing this
purpose. We will consider additional examples in Part III.
B. Soft Law as an Epistemic Instrument
In international law, much discussion has revolved around the possibility that soft
law reflects normative commitments that governments will not initially treat as law but
that nonetheless eventually influence them or their successors.69 The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights is the preeminent example. Formally, the Declaration had
no legal effect; it was merely a declaration to which states agreed on condition that it
create no legal obligations.70 Today, it has a great deal of normative authority. States
criticize others for failing to live up to the Declaration’s aspirations, and they go to the
trouble of defending themselves when subject to like criticism. How did this happen?
An initial puzzle concerns the moral status of the Declaration itself. If the
Declaration merely embodied universal or widely held moral views, then it is not clear
what the Declaration adds to this prior moral consensus. Writing down our moral views
on a piece of paper should not make them any stronger. On the other hand, if the
Declaration deviates from moral views, then presumably the Declaration would not have
much moral force.71
To understand how norms might spread, suppose that agents have some but not
full information about the state of the world; that their beliefs are independent, that is, not
derived from the same sources or sources that are in some way correlated; and that they
sincerely express their views through a voting process. As the size of the group increases,
the probability that the majority will vote correctly increases at an exponential rate. So
even if each individual has only a low probability of being correct, a relatively small
group will jointly reveal the correct state of the world with a probability that rapidly
approaches one as the group size increases. This phenomenon is known as the Condorcet
Jury Theorem.72
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In the real world, people who vote in groups do not always satisfy these
conditions. They do not always vote sincerely, and they sometimes have zero rather than
a little information about the issue in question. If individual members of a group pick the
wrong answer more often than the right answer, then the aggregate judgment of the group
will not tend towards accuracy. Nonetheless, the larger point is that when an institution
(or person) expresses its views about a topic, it reveals information that others can benefit
from, and the informational benefits can sometimes be dramatic.73
Let us distinguish two types of facts: descriptive and normative. A descriptive fact
is that the Armenian genocide occurred. A moral fact is that the Armenian genocide was
wrong. No one doubts that descriptive facts exist; the case for moral facts is more
complicated, but it is at least plausible that certain moral judgments are facts or
sufficiently fact-like that the Condorcet Jury Theorem can be applied to them.74
In the case of congressional resolutions, the Condorcet Jury Theorem operates at
two levels. The congressional resolution aggregates the votes of members, and the
congressional resolution can be treated as one vote in a larger, more informal national or
global debate about a particular moral or descriptive fact. If one thinks that the members
of Congress voted sincerely and had independent (or roughly independent) sources of
information, then one should be more inclined to believe that the Armenian genocide
occurred (and was wrong, assuming that moral facts exist) as a result of the resolution.
And if multiple legislatures, governments, or other institutions around the world issue
similar resolutions or statements, and one believes that they vote sincerely and on the
basis of independent sources of information, then one’s inclination to believe that the
genocide occurred should be strengthened. A similar point can be made about resolutions
that praise military withdrawals and peace agreements,75 condemn human rights
violations, military threats, and internal meddling,76 urge reform in foreign countries,77
and identify domestic problems that need attention.78
There is reason to be skeptical about whether congressional resolutions actually
do work in a Condorcetian manner.79 The opposite phenomenon—herding or cascading,
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where people imitate others for reputational or informational purposes—is just as
plausible.80 Voting might simply reflect public sentiment or a desire to go along with
colleagues for other reasons. Still, if the Condorcetian theory applies with respect to
either descriptive facts or moral facts, then the soft statute can be informative and useful.
C. Soft Law Versus Hard Law: Costs and Benefits
There are two main advantages of soft law. First, it is cheaper to produce than
hard law, as it does not require Presidential consent. Second, soft law more accurately
conveys information about congressional views than hard law does. That information is
particularly useful in domains where Congress acts without the President’s cooperation—
as it does when it expresses its views about its constitutional role, exercises oversight
over regulatory agencies, and expresses legislative views where the President’s views are
already known, are in tension with Congress’s views, or are not relevant.
The main disadvantage of soft law is straightforward: it does not produce legally
binding rules except in the uncertain case where a prior hard law enactment vests it with
this authority. Another possible disadvantage of soft law is that it may violate rule of law
values such as clarity that the procedural formalities are supposed to protect.81
1. Advantages of Soft Law
We have argued that soft law conveys congressional views. But Congress also
communicates using hard statutes—directly influencing behavior and advancing
normative judgments. Why are soft statutes ever a preferable mechanism for conveying
information, given that ordinary statutes convey information and have the additional
desired effect of binding force?
Cheapness. The first advantage of soft laws is that they can sometimes
accomplish what hard laws accomplish but at a lower cost.82 Suppose, for example, that
at time 1 Congress is considering whether to pass a law at time 2. This law will tax some
behavior X. However, at time 1 Congress is not certain whether X is desirable or
undesirable, or whether a law that taxed X would have undesirable consequences.
Congress could handle its uncertainty with various hard law methods. (a) It could pass
the law at time 1, realizing that it can repeal the law if it has undesirable effects at time 2.
(b) It could pass the law at time 1 and subject it to a sunset provision, realizing that it can
reenact the law if it has desirable effects at time 2. (c) It could wait until time 2 before
enacting the law and possibly make the law retroactive. (d) It could also pass the law with
moderate sanctions or loopholes so that the effect of the law reflects Congress’s
conflict with the premises of rational choice theory. See David Austen-Smith & Jeffrey S. Banks,
Information Aggregation, Rationality, and the Condorcet Jury Theorem, 90 AM. POLIT. SCI. REV. 34, 42
(1996).
80
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uncertainty about the undesirability of X. All of these approaches have various costs and
benefits.83
The soft-law alternative is to (for example) issue a resolution at time 1 that
condemns X. Such a law will lead people to believe that enactment of a hard law at time
2 is more likely but still not certain. The law will produce fewer behavioral changes than
(a) and (b) (if the sanction is high enough), but more effects than (c). And it could have
more or less effect than (d), depending on what the sanctions and loopholes are. With
respect to (a) and (b), the soft law approach is cheaper; it need not be cheaper with
respect to (c) and (d). Depending on the degree of Congress’s uncertainty and the relative
costs of enacting soft and hard law, the legislature could prefer soft law to the
alternatives. An additional advantage of the soft law is that it may stimulate debate.
Seeing that a hard law is possible in the future, people will come forward with arguments
for or against, which will in turn improve Congress’s ability to evaluate X.84
Or consider our earlier suggestion that Congress’s judgment about states of the
world can influence the public’s views. Suppose Congress seeks to condemn the
Armenian genocide while the President prefers not to, fearing injury to American
relations with Turkey. Nonetheless, the President would be willing to sign into law a bill
condemning the Armenian genocide in return for congressional cooperation on some
other issue. A hard-law condemnation of the Armenian genocide would be more costly
for Congress than a soft-law condemnation would be. At the same time, the soft-law
condemnation could be just as effective as the hard-law condemnation. If the public trusts
Congress but not the President, then Presidential participation in the statement adds
nothing to its credibility. Thus, in the right conditions, the cheapness of the soft law
approach can produce benefits for Congress without offsetting costs.
Information about legislative preferences. Soft statutes can be better indicators of
legislative intent than hard statutes or legislative history.85 As an indicator of underlying
views of the Senate, the Senate Resolution is a better instrument than a hard statute is. As
an indicator of congressional views, the concurrent resolution is a better instrument than a
hard statute. The reason is that the prospect of a Presidential veto will affect the
legislation that Congress proposes.86 To illustrate, suppose there are three potential
meanings of a statutory provision: A, B, and C. Congress prefers interpretation A to B
and prefers B to C. The President prefers meaning C to B and B to A. If the President
83
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would veto meaning A, Congress will pass a statute with meaning B. The statute is a
correct indicator of congressional intent in the sense that a majority of both houses
preferred meaning B to C and meaning B to the status quo. It is, however, a poor
indicator of what Congress thought best because what Congress “says” is a function of
what the President prefers. A hard statute is a low-clarity instrument with respect to
congressional intent because it reflects the views of multiple institutions.87
The question arises why one should care about the intent of the Senate or House
alone, or the two houses jointly. After all, they can create law only by securing the
consent of the President. However, this last statement is not accurate. When Congress
acts on its own (for example, overriding a veto), or houses operate separately (the Senate
handles appointments, consents to treaties, adjudicates impeachments; the House initiates
impeachments, originates revenue bills), observers will want more refined information
than that contained in a statute. And when the President’s views are already well-known,
or the President is on his way out of office, Congress’s views might be all that people
need to learn. Indeed, in several important cases that we discuss below, Congress’s views
alone are of crucial importance: in Congress’s effort to stake out its constitutional role
vis-à-vis that of the President, and in oversight of regulatory agencies. In these cases, the
soft statute conveys better information about future political outputs than hard statutes do.
Soft statutes can convey information only if people have reason to believe that
they actually reflect Congress’s views. Skepticism about the credibility of congressional
documents, such as legislative history, is widespread, and might extend to soft statutes as
well. Legislative actors often make statements that are not reliable indicators of their
actual views. When a legislator makes a speech on the floor proclaiming her view on
some matter, it is sometimes cheap talk. There is virtually no cost to entering a statement
in the Congressional Record. Other than sanctions imposed by fellow legislators or the
public, there are no concrete costs that the legislator must bear in making the statement.
Be that as it may, it is incorrect to say that the simple resolution is cheap talk and
therefore not credible; it entails some positive cost less than the cost of enacting a statute
but more than the cost of a legislative speech.88 In addition, as we discussed in Part
II.A.2.b, even cheap talk can be credible when a speaker takes a position on a
controversial issue, thus losing future opportunities to cooperate with those on the other
side of that issue.
2. Disadvantages of Soft Law
The binding effect of hard law is its straightforward advantage over soft law, and
we need not dwell on this issue. A more interesting possibility is that hard law better
satisfies rule of law values such as publicity than soft law does. The main distinction
between hard law and soft law is that hard law complies with formalities that clearly
87
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distinguish binding law. A central tenet of the rule of law is that law be public, so that
people may debate it, object to it, and plan their lives around it. Secret law is anathema
and perhaps soft law resembles secret law.
This concern can be easily overstated. If soft law is secret, then it cannot regulate,
in which case it cannot serve any useful purpose. Congressional resolutions themselves
also comply with formalities that distinguish them from unenacted bills. Nonetheless, one
might worry that unsophisticated people, or people who cannot get legal advice, are
likely to misunderstand the importance of soft law, putting them at a disadvantage with
respect to savvier fellow citizens.
Consider, for example, Susan Rose-Ackerman’s critique of the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of The Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act in
Pennhurst State School v. Halderman.89 The Court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that
the statute created judicially enforceable rights for the developmentally disabled, arguing
instead that the weak language in the Act indicated that Congress intended to announce a
policy in the hope of eliciting a favorable response from states. Rose-Ackerman argues
that the Court’s holding permitted Congress to earn public credit by enacting a statute
that expressed popular aspirations but did not have any effect. She argues that the Court
should have “repealed” the statute, which would embarrass Congress and force it to enact
clearer legislation.
The Act was not a soft statute but a hortatory hard statute. It was duly enacted but
had no formal legal effect. Nonetheless, Rose-Ackerman believed that such a statute
would deceive the public, leading it to extend credit to a Congress that has accomplished
nothing at all. The problem with this view is that Congress did, in fact, do something: it
announced a policy on the treatment of developmentally disabled people, a policy that
was consistent with other hard-statute rules and could well have anticipated further
legislative developments.90 Announcing the policy in advance might well have encourage
states and private actors to adjust their behavior in advance of hard legislation.
However, Rose-Ackerman may be correct that rule of law values require that
courts strike down statutes that are ambiguous and confusing, at least in certain
conditions. The rule of lenity in criminal law reflects this idea: people should not go to
jail because they violate criminal statutes that they cannot understand. If this concern is
valid for hard law, it is even stronger for soft law, where people might not understand that
a soft statute may affect behavior. If only sophisticated people can anticipate Congress’s
changing views about the treatment of developmentally disabled people on the basis of
hortatory statutes or concurrent resolutions, then unsophisticated people are put at a
disadvantage.
By the same token, if the public typically associates hard statutes with binding
obligations, then using the hortatory statute with only precatory language creates
confusion. If the public associates soft statutes with nonbinding obligations, then the soft

89

451 U.S. 1 (1981).

90

See the discussion in Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc. v. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. 432, 443-45 (1985).

21

Soft Law

statute will be superior to the hard hortatory statute because it will accomplish the same
communicative ends, but avoid the confusion produced by using a hard statute.
One might also fear that if Congress can regulate with soft statutes, then the
constitutional requirement of presentment is rendered void and the President’s legislative
role is eliminated. The procedural formalities of legislation do not just clarify
congressional action; they also ensure that Congress does not cut the President out of the
picture. Just such a concern lay behind the Supreme Court’s rejection of the legislative
veto. The analogous concern can be found in the literature on international soft law. If
international law obtains its legitimacy from the consent of states, as if often assumed,91
how can international soft law—that is, international law that lacks the consent of at least
some states—have any legitimacy?92 We address the constitutional question in Part IV.C.
For now, we make two points.
First, to the extent that the regulative power of soft law comes from the fact that it
anticipates constitutionally valid hard law (with the president’s consent, or approved in
another constitutionally accepted way), then the concern falls away. Potentially regulated
parties will understand that the congressional resolution does not predict the President’s
action, and will place only as much weight on it as it will bear standing alone. The
problem, if there is one, arises only when a congressional resolution affects behavior by
generating knowledge about states of the world or supplying focal points; and when
courts or other legal institutions use soft law as inputs for statutory interpretation,
common law development, and other regulatory activities. In these cases, Congress
affects behavior without presidential involvement.
Second, any concern that soft statutes could give Congress an excessive role in
affecting public behavior must take account of the President’s own ability to sway the
public using the presidency as a bully pulpit, and the President’s other institutional
advantages such as the presidential signing statement. Congress’s statements about its
view of the world must compete with the President’s, and in modern times the President
has much greater public visibility than Congress does. For this reason, the claim that soft
statutes subvert legitimate presidential authority is, at least in modern circumstances,
difficult to credit.

III. APPLICATIONS
A. The Public
Congress seeks to influence public behavior, and enactment of statutes is the
normal method for doing so. As we argued above, a statute can be analyzed as a type of
communication that affects people’s beliefs about the legal consequences of their
actions—in the form of sanctions (or rewards). If a legislature enacts a statute at time 1
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that governs behavior at time 2, people will update their beliefs about the probability that
a sanction will be applied to that behavior. Enactment of a hard statute, however, only
affects probabilities; it does not create certainty. If no statute exists, people might still
believe that at time 2 a sanction will be applied to the behavior in question with
probability, p. For example, Congress might enact a later statute that applies
retroactively. If instead a statute is enacted at time 1, people will raise their probability
estimate to p*, but p* need not equal 1. Congress might subsequently repeal the statute
before it has any effect or enact additional statutes that offset the sanction of the first
statute. And even if the hard statute remains in force, officials who administer the statute
will have discretion about how stringently to enforce it. The enactment of a hard statute
then, should only cause individuals to update their beliefs that the relevant behavior will
be sanctioned in the future from p (prior to the statute) to p*, where p<p*<1.
Now consider a soft statute of equivalent content. By revealing information about
Congress’s intentions, the soft statute will cause people, in most cases, to update their
beliefs about the probability that a sanction will be applied to the relevant behavior at
time 2. The new probability, p’, in general will be less than p*. A congressional
resolution that disapproves of the relevant conduct makes it more likely that a subsequent
statute will prohibit that conduct, but tends to increase the probability of that prohibition
being in effect by less than a hard statute would. In the case of a hard statute, the behavior
will not be regulated at time 2 only if the hard statute is repealed; in the case of a soft
statute, the behavior will not be regulated at time 2 unless a hard statute is enacted.
Nonetheless, it is important to see that we are dealing only with probabilities.
As a broad generalization, a soft statute is a cheaper but weaker instrument than a
hard statute: it is easier to pass but will have less effect on people’s beliefs about the legal
regime in the future, and hence on their actual behavior. It is not the case, however, that
the soft statute will have no effect on public behavior because it does not create legal
sanctions. Even if individuals are purely instrumental, that is, influenced only by the costs
and benefits of the given behavior, the soft statute reveals information about future legal
rules, and therefore will often affect behavior. If Congress says that it will not raise
taxes,93 then people should accordingly update their beliefs about the likelihood of higher
taxes. If the Senate urges that sanctions should be imposed on the government of
Myanmar,94 then exporters will take note that they are only one house away (plus
presidential consent) from disruption of their business. If the Senate expresses doubt
about further need for emergency unemployment payments, then those who administer or
benefit from those payments will similarly need to adjust their behavior.95
To make the point crisper, compare a hard statute with a deferred implementation
rule. The statute is passed in the year 2015, but will not go into effect until the year 2020.
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Will the statute have no impact on public behavior between 2015-2020? Individuals will
anticipate the change in legal regime. This may mean they rush to complete prohibited
activity before the statute goes into effect or it may mean that individuals start investing
in substitute activities in anticipation of the new rule. Here too, the issue is one of
probabilities. The new law will not go into effect in 2020 with certainty; it might be
repealed prior to that point or intervening statutes could limit its effect. Rational
decisionmakers will, nonetheless, alter their behavior, even during the time period when
the hard statute does not yet have legal effect.96
Despite their unenforceability, in some situations soft statutes can be more
effective than hard statutes. Suppose, for example, people are concerned about how
agencies will regulate them, and further believe that Congress, by virtue of its oversight
authority, has more control over agencies than the President does.97 Congressional
resolutions that provide an indication of Congress’s regulatory goals may well provide
better information about future regulations than statutes do, especially if the statutes,
because they must involve compromise with the sitting (as opposed to future) President,
have only limited influence on agency action.
For example, the 109th Congress approved a resolution that Congress should
enact “mandatory, market-based limits” on greenhouse gas emissions.98 Expectations
about binding legislation have prompted some emitters of greenhouse gases in the United
States to voluntarily agree to inventory and reduce carbon emissions through the EPA’s
Climate Leaders Program.99 Today, a bill that regulates greenhouse gas emissions is
pending before Congress.100 Firms that adjusted in response to the soft statute may have a
competitive advantage should the bill pass. There are numerous other soft statutes that fit
this pattern.101
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State legislatures use soft statutes to anticipate potential hard statutes in the future
as well. For example, in 1985, the Oklahoma legislature adopted a concurrent resolution
requesting that certain utility companies using coal fired generating plants consider
blending ten percent Oklahoma coal with the Wyoming coal that they were using.102
After the utility companies declined to comply, a hard statute was passed by the
subsequent legislature. After a year of noncompliance with the hard statute, the
legislature passed another concurrent resolution directing Oklahoma’s state regulatory
agency to investigate the noncompliance.103
B. The President
1. Constitutional Authority
Soft statutes can also play an important role in the allocation of authority between
Congress and the President. Consider the question how the courts should evaluate
executive action at the boundaries of Article II authority. In Youngstown,104 Justice
Jackson famously established a typology for understanding the borders of Article II
power. “When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of
Congress, his authority is at its maximum. . . .”105 When Congress has said nothing or
there is concurrent authority, there is a zone of twilight:106
When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of
authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone
of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which
its distribution is uncertain. Therefore, congressional inertia, indifference or
quiescence may sometimes, at least as a practical matter, enable, if not invite,
measures on independent Presidential responsibility.107
The President is on weakest ground when Congress has disapproved of the action “When
the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of
Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own
constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter.”108
Justice Jackson’s language is instructive. He does not say “when a formal statute
grants or denies Presidential authority.” Instead, he refers to the express or implied will of
Congress, suggesting that implicit acquiescence will be enough to justify executive action
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in the zone of ambiguous executive authority. The soft statute could be the best
mechanism for articulating congressional views in this setting.109
The soft statue is better indicator of legislative views than legislative inaction is.
There are dozens of reasons Congress fails to act and negative inferences in the context
of Article II powers are especially hazardous. In fact, the soft law analytic frame makes
clear that Justice Jacksons’ typology is actually incomplete. Speaking of congressional
agreement, disapproval, or silence, is unnecessarily crude. The House might authorize the
Presidential action and the Senate might expressly disavow it (or vice versa), creating a
twilight of the twilight category.
Congress does sometimes use resolutions for these purposes. For example, during
2007, a concurrent resolution was introduced “Expressing the sense of Congress that the
President should not initiate military action against Iran without first obtaining
authorization from Congress.”110 During the same Congress, Senate Resolutions were
offered to censure the President, Vice-President, and Attorney General for conduct
related to the war in Iraq, detainment of enemy combatants, and wiretapping practices
undertaken without warrants.111 Another proposed resolution stated the sense of the
Senate that the President has Constitutional authority to veto individual items of
appropriation without additional statutory authorization.112 These potential soft statutes
were not passed by majorities, but they are precisely the sort of information on the scope
of permissible executive authority that would inform Justice Jackson’s analysis.113
In this scenario, legislative sentiments, expressed in nonbinding mechanisms, are
taken as inputs in the decision-making processes of other institutions—the courts—that
themselves generate binding rules, that is, hard law. Even without judicial involvement,
however, resolutions that assert congressional authority or that assert limitations on
Presidential authority may influence the way that the two political branches share power
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with each other—either as moves in a game where each side must both cooperate and
compete, or as appeals to public opinion.114
2. Soft Statutes as Political Support
This is not, however, the only way for a soft statute to affect Presidential decisionmaking. Suppose that the President announces that hostilities in Iran are a threat to the
interest of the United States and he intends to send troops. Congress enacts one of two
potential soft statutes. The first proclaims that a majority of both houses of Congress
disagree with the President’s determination. The hostilities, in the view of the legislature,
do not constitute a threat to U.S. interests. The second potential soft statute proclaims
agreement with the President’s determination and expresses the mood of the chambers
that the conflict warrants U.S. engagement. Even if neither resolution generates legal
authority for the President’s troops, a soft statute might nonetheless affect Presidential
decision-making in two ways.
If the President believes that he will need congressional cooperation to complete a
successful military campaign, he will need to pay attention to the views of the legislature.
The President will need appropriations, of course; he may also have needs incidental to
the war effort where his constitutional power does not plausibly extend—to raise the
salaries of officers, for example. He may need Congress to cooperate in his domestic
programs, and a Congress that opposes the war may be unwilling to do so. The soft
statute will express Congress’s opposition more effectively than communications from
leaders or other members because Congress acts as a body. If Congress later breaks its
word, then its credibility will be diminished, and future efforts to influence the President
will be hampered. To avoid this institutional cost, members of Congress may feel bound
by earlier votes.
Alternatively, the soft statute might have Condorcetian effects, revealing that
members of Congress independently agree or disagree with the President’s assessment.
Such a resolution might affect the President’s own views, but even if it does not, it could
affect the views of important others—the American public, foreign governments. Since
the President needs the cooperation of these groups, the soft statute influences future
Presidential decisions.
For example, a concurrent resolution introduced in the 104th Congress expressed
Congress’s opposition to President Clinton’s planned deployment of United States
ground forces to Bosnia.115 A proposed Senate resolution in the next Congress urged the
President to facilitate the withdrawal of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards from BosniaHerzegovina.116 The first resolution signaled potential opposition in Congress. The
second expressed support for a potential action by the President. Similarly, a proposed
concurrent resolution in 2001 expressed “support for the President in using all means at
his disposal to encourage the establishment of a democratically elected government in
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Iraq.”117 Contrast an alternative proposed resolution urging that the United States work
through the United Nations to assure Iraq’s compliance with existing U.N. resolutions.118
Each proposed resolution reveals information both about legislative preferences and
about the underlying state of the world.
C. Agencies
Congress uses a range of instruments to influence administrative agencies,
including restrictions on the appointment and removal of personnel, specification of
substantive or procedural restrictions, appropriations, oversight hearings, and deadlines.
Before the Supreme Court held it unconstitutional, the legislative veto was another such
mechanism.119 Assume that the hard law version of the legislative veto is unavailable
because it is unconstitutional. Could a soft statute variant accomplish similar ends?120
I.N.S. v. Chadha addressed whether a person’s immigration status could be
adjusted by a simple resolution, where the initial decision to adjust or not was made by
the Attorney General. Consider a hypothetical variant. Suppose the Attorney General
makes a determination that person A should be deported. Using a concurrent resolution,
both houses of Congress object to this determination and urge the Attorney General to
reverse it. The Attorney General has no legal obligation to do as Congress wishes, but the
Attorney General may nonetheless be influenced by the resolution. As between
contradicting the wishes of Congress and avoiding a confrontation, the Attorney General
will often prefer the latter because Congress controls appropriations, holds oversight
hearings, and has other ways to take revenge. In this way, the soft legislative veto would
do some of the practical work done by the hard legislative veto. To make the actual legal
adjustment to immigration status, action by the executive branch is required, but the nonbinding congressional action increases this probability.
Congress does use soft statutes to affect agency behavior and agencies reference
soft statutes in rules and in their decision-making process. A close soft variant of the
legislative veto relates to the FTC’s proposed changes to the “Made in America” labeling
requirements.121 Over 200 members of the House cosponsored a resolution opposing the
117
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proposed guidelines and urging the commission to retain the old standards.122 The FTC
ultimately abandoned the proposed changes, citing, in part, the opposition in Congress.123
Or consider a 1988 concurrent resolution that sought “To acknowledge the
contribution of the Iroquois Confederacy of Nations . . . and to reaffirm the continuing
government-to-government relationship between Indian tribes and the United States
established in the Constitution.”124 The Federal Emergency Management Agency took
the statement to be a relevant input in its decision to formulate a “government-togovernment” relationship policy with American Indian tribes.125 Another Concurrent
resolution suggested “that the proceeds” of a reserve fund should be used “for the benefit
of livestock producers” adversely affected by disaster conditions.126 In response, the
Secretary of Agriculture did so.127 Even resolutions not formally voted on may influence
agency behavior. Resolutions introduced in both the House and the Senate, with strong
bipartisan support,128 urged that OSHA revise regulations on powered industrial truck
operator training. Soon thereafter, OSHA published a notice of proposed rulemaking to
revise the training requirements.129 It has long been appreciated that Congress uses all
sorts of formal and informal mechanisms to influence administrative agencies.130
Appointments, appropriations, and oversight hearings are the tools that receive the most
scholarly attention, but soft statutes influence agencies as well.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR COURTS
A. Statutory Interpretation
Soft statutes can be useful for statutory interpretation in two ways. First, if the
legislative intent behind a hard statute is relevant to interpretation of that statute, then a
contemporaneous or subsequent soft statute that reveals the legislative intent behind the
hard statute provides relevant information for an interpreter such as a court. Second, if a
later Congresses’ policy views are relevant for interpreting or construing the earlier
statute, then the interpreter should draw on soft statutes in order to obtain information
about these views.131
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The first argument sits atop a complicated debate about the value of preenactment and post-enactment legislative history. Some scholars and judges believe that
courts should not rely on legislative history as evidence of legislative intent because
members of Congress can easily insert statements in the record that contradict the views
of the majority that passed the statute.132 Other scholars and judges believe that courts
should use those portions of legislative history that are credible, such as committee
reports, statements by sponsors, or speeches just prior to votes.133 The latter group should
have no objection if courts rely on contemporaneous resolutions expressing Congress’s
understanding of a statute. Such resolutions are better indicators of congressional
understanding than virtually any other form of legislative history. Legislative-history
skeptics should object less to giving interpretive authority to resolutions than to other
types of pre-enactment and post-enactment legislative history produced during the
enacting period congress: resolutions express the views of a majority, while other
legislative history does not.134
However, it would be unusual for Congress to issue a resolution expressing its
understanding of a statute at the same time that it passes a statute, and we have found no
such example.135 In the more usual case, Congress passes a resolution later—later in the
same session, or in a later session—in response to a supervening event, and the question
might arise whether this post-enactment history should be given weight by courts. For
example, in December 2006, President Bush signed the Postal Reform Act into law and
issued a signing statement construing a provision to permit searches of sealed mail in
exigent circumstances. In January 2007, a Senate Resolution was introduced “affirming
the constitutional and statutory protections accorded sealed domestic mail.”136 The
resolution could be interpreted as an effort to reassert the legislative understanding of the
original statute; if so, a court might properly rely on it when interpreting that statute.

judicial interpretation because this would allow Congress to amend or repeal prior statute without signature
of the President and implementation of the law is judicial rather than legislative function).
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See Antonin Scalia, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION (1997); Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519
(Scalia, J., concurring in judgment); Hirschey v. FERC, 777 F.2d 1, 7-8 (D.C. Cir. 1985). See generally
Dan Farber & Philip Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 423 (1988).
133

See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CA. L. REV.
845 (1992) (arguing that legislative history can reveal legislative intent or purpose and resolve statutory
ambiguity).
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Setting aside scholars and judges who do not think the intent of the legislature is relevant for statutory
interpretation.
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The closest example we have found is S. Con. Res. 107, 81st Cong. (passed Senate Sept. 13, 1950),
which was passed by the Senate within sixty days of the enactment of the G.I. Bill of Rights, Pub. L. 610,
81st Cong. (July 13, 1950), and would apparently have passed the House shortly thereafter, but for a
congressional recess. The resolution purported to clarify the intent of the enacting legislature with respect
to interpretation of the act. See Gibson, supra note 131, at 421-22 (discussing statute and resolution), at 479
(“During the past forty years at least, [1910-1950] there have been very few congressional attempts, by
concurrent resolution, to construe federal statutes”).
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The debate concerned the Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act, Pub-L. 109-435. See S. Res. 22,
100th Cong., 1st Sess. (Jan. 10, 2007), at Cong. Rec. S394-S395.
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In the sealed mail example, the enactment of the statute, the intervening act, and
the post-enactment soft statute occurred within a few months of each other. Sometimes a
good deal more time elapses. For example, in 1983, the House passed a resolution
purporting to declare the intent of the 1972 legislature about the breadth of Title IX.137
Here, we might expect a court to be more suspicious about the House’s claim to know the
legislative intent of the 1972 Congress, and, in fact, the conventional rule is that courts
should give no weight to such resolutions.138 “[T]he views of a subsequent Congress form
a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier one.”139
However, this rule sits uneasily with another judicial practice—that of giving
weight to legislative inaction by subsequent legislatures.140 Legislative inaction is
sometimes interpreted as implicit approval of a judicial or agency interpretation of an
earlier statute.141 The acquiescence rule infers legislative approval from the failure to
overrule a prior interpretation. The reenactment rule infers legislative approval of a prior
interpretation when a legislature re-enacts or amends a statute without specifically
137

H. Res. 190, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 Cong. Rec. H10100 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 1983) (Title IX intended
institution wide rather than program specific). Under the “program-specific” approach, receipt of federal
funds would trigger Title IX’s obligations only within cabined programs or departments. The institution
wide approach implies that the receipt of federal funds by any subdivision of the institution or university,
triggers obligations for the entire institution.
138

See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REV. 67, 96 (1988) (“Thus,
nonbinding resolutions, passed by both Houses of Congress but not presented to the President, are not
formally entitled to authoritative weight in statutory interpretation.”); see also John C. Grabow,
Congressional Silence and the Search for Legislative Intent: A Venture into ‘Speculative Unrealities’, 64
B.U. L. REV. 737, 748 (1984) (Supreme Court has shown great reluctance to give weight to subsequent
resolutions for construction of earlier statutes, and discussing failure of Grove City College Court to even
mention concurrent resolution speaking directly to whether Title IX was program specific institution wide).
But see Butler v. United States Department of Agriculture, 826 F.2d 409, 414 n. 6 (5th Cir.1987). See also
F.H.E Oil Co. v. C.I.R., 150 F.2d 857, 858 (1945) (“Although Congressional resolutions do not have the
force of law, the resolution in the matter before the court is an . . . expression of opinion on a point of law
... [that is] entitled to most respectful consideration by the courts . . . .”); North Haven Board of Education
v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 535 (1982); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 687 n.7 (1979).
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United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313 (1960). See also Mass. v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1461, n.27
(2007); S.D. v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329, 354 (1998); Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 420 (1994)
(“subsequent history is less illuminating than the contemporaneous evidence”); Andrus v. Shell Oil co., 446
U.S. 657, 666 (1980); Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 411 (n.11 (1979); Cobell
v. Norton, 428 F.3d 1070, 1075 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“post-enactment legislative history is not only
oxymoronic but inherently entitled to little weight”); Eskridge, supra note 138, at 95. For an earlier
attempt, to use a concurrent resolution to influence interpretation of a previously enacted statute, see S.
Con. Res. 4, 106th Cong. (passed Senate Jan. 9, 1928) interpreting the Tariff Act of 1922, 42 Stat. 858
(1922), such that “with respect to imported broken rice, ‘broken’ rice shall include only the class ‘Brewers
milled rice’ as specified in the united standards for milled rice”). Interestingly, the House refused to enact
the concurrent resolution, stating in H. Res. 92 that the proposed concurrent resolution “contravenes the
first clause of the seventh section of the first article of the Constitution of the United States.” See also
Gibson, supra note 131, at 480 (discussing interaction between the House and Senate on the issue).
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Eskridge, Interpreting Legislative Inaction, supra note 138; Dan Farber, Statutory Interpretation,
Legislative Inaction, and Civil Rights, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2 (1988).
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North Haven Board v. Bell, supra. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Post-Enactment Legislative
Signals, 57 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 75 (1994).
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changing the prior interpretation. The rejected proposal rule presumes majoritarian
approval of a prior interpretation when an amendment altering a judicial interpretation (or
changing the text of a statute to clarify) is considered, but rejected in Congress.142 Each
of these rules makes an inference about subsequent legislative views, on the basis of
congressional inaction or congressional action that has multiple interpretations.
There is ample reason to be skeptical of the Court’s periodic reliance on
congressional inaction in subsequent legislatures for purposes of statutory
interpretation.143 Nevertheless, if subsequent congressional silence or inaction is ever
relevant for statutory interpretation, surely congressional voice (in the form of soft
statutes) should be as well.144 Congress may not always have an incentive to express its
views candidly,145 but there is no reason to think that voice will be less reliable than
silence.
The second argument rests on a more controversial premise but if the premise is
accepted, then the case for soft statutes is even stronger. The premise is that when a court
interprets a statute that was enacted by a past Congress, it should allow itself to be
influenced by the views of the current Congress.146 Others have argued that, whether
courts should be influenced in theory by the current Congress, they will be influenced in
practice, because the current (or future) legislature could overturn the court’s decision
and judges dislike seeing their holdings overturned.147 For these scholars, congressional
resolutions should be reasonable devices for Congress to reveal its evolving policy views
to judges. As a possible illustration of this view, consider the dissent by Justice Stevens
in Garcetti v. Ceballos.148 Justice Stevens relied, in part, on Congress’s endorsement, via
concurrent resolution, of the view that citizens should expose corruption in government
to inform his view on the scope of First Amendment protection for government
employees.149
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Eskridge, supra note 138, at 69, 95, 117.

143

See Eskridge, supra note 138, at 95-108 (surveying range of formalist, realist, and systemic problems
with inferring legislative intent from inaction); but see Farber, supra note 138, at 10 (subsequent legislative
silence is informative of approval, even if not perfectly informative).
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See also Massachusetts Credit Union Share Ins. Corp., v. National Credit Union Administration, 693 F.
Supp. 1225, 1230-31 (1988). For a similar proposal, see Greene, supra note 109. Greene argues in favor of
allowing concurrent resolutions to block the exercise of the Presidential powers exercised pursuant to an
implicit delegation.
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On legislative incentives to tell the truth, see McNollgast, Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive
Political Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 57 LAW & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 3 (1994); McNollgast,
Positive Canons, 80 GEO. L.J. 705 (1992).
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Einer Elhauge, Preference-Estimating Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 2027 (2002); Einer
Elhauge, Preference-Eliciting Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 2162 (2002).
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126 S. Ct. 1951, 1966 n.4 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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We already noted the 1983 House Resolution attempting to clarify legislative
views on the meaning of Title IX.150 State legislatures also occasionally use resolutions
for similar reasons. For example, in response to confusion in the courts, the Michigan
Legislature passed a concurrent resolution declaring that an existing statute was “not
designed to disrupt benefits which were already being received by an employee prior to
the effective date of this act or benefits resulting from injuries incurred prior to the act's
effective date.”151 The Delaware legislature once passed a concurrent resolution
clarifying that the repeal of a statute was not to be applied retroactively.152 In Vaught v.
Wortz,153 the Delaware Supreme Court held that the ambiguity in the initial statute was
properly resolved by the subsequent concurrent resolution “which evidence[d] a clear
legislative intent that the Repealer is to be given only prospective application.”154
A soft statute purporting to clarify the meaning of an earlier hard statute should
not control if the text of the earlier statute is clear. In a case of statutory ambiguity
however, a soft statute should be given weight. Unlike other forms of legislative history,
commonly given weight already, the soft statute is majoritarian and it provides a better
indication of congressional intent than congressional silence or inaction.
If we are right, it is puzzling that Congress rarely uses soft statutes in this way.
However, there is a possible explanation. Given that courts rarely permit Congress to
offer interpretations of earlier statutes by passing resolutions, there is no reason for
Congress to enact them. If judicial practice changed, congressional behavior would likely
shift as well.
B. Constitutional Interpretation
There are many views about which institution should have ultimate authority to
say what the constitution means, but scholars and judges with divergent interpretive
philosophies agree that legislative interpretations of the Constitution should have some
weight, and this consensus appears to be accepted by the Supreme Court as well.155 A
long history of congressional practice is often taken as evidence that the constitution does
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H.R.J. Res. 190, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. H10100 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 1983).
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Both Houses of the Michigan Legislature passed a concurrent resolution declaring that the coordination
provisions were “not designed to disrupt benefits which were already being received by an employee prior
to the effective date of this act or benefits resulting from injuries incurred prior to the act’s effective date.”
See Senate Con. Res. 575, adopted by the Senate on April 1, 1982, and by the House on May 18, 1982;
1982 Senate J. 626, 706-707; 1982 House J. 1262. See General Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181
(1992).
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See also Marcucilli v. Boardwalk Builders, 2000 Del Super. LEXIS 137.
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495 A.2d 1132, 1133 (Del. Sup. 1985).
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Id. at 1133. Other state courts disagree. See State v. Barnes, 55 Idaho 578, 588 (1935) (Morgan, J.,
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enacted a law, shall dictate the interpretation or construction to be placed upon it.”).
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See ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY 267-69 (2006).
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not prohibit it.156 Indeed, in exercising only narrow judicial review of statutes, the
Supreme Court often emphasizes that it takes a deferential approach—implicitly
acknowledging that Congress’s judgment about the constitutionality of legislation
deserves weight. As a practical matter, when Congress decides that a statute would not be
constitutional and therefore does not pass it, it will not matter that the Supreme Court
disagrees.157 Additionally, the political question doctrine carves out swaths of
constitutional adjudication that the judiciary will not resolve.158 When the Constitution
commits an interpretive question to another branch or when there are no judicially
ascertainable standards, courts let the political branches resolve the dispute.159 And
Congress’s judgments about the constitutionality of its internal procedures often receive
absolute deference from the courts.160 For those more skeptical of judicial supremacy,161
legislative views about constitutional meaning are all but dispositive. Thus, although
scholars differ about the amount of weight congressional judgments about the
constitution deserve, nearly everyone agrees that they deserve at least some weight.
If congressional views of constitutional meaning have importance, then the
question arises what mechanism is likely to be most effective for articulating a body of
legislative constitutional law. However, the mechanism for articulating legislative views
about the constitution has received little attention from commentators. Prior suggestions
include using committee reports,162 confirmation hearings,163 and the bare fact of
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See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 200 (2003) (“History reveals an unbroken Congressional
practice of granting to authors of works with existing copyrights the benefit of term extensions so that all
under copyright protection will be governed evenhandedly under the same regime.”).
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See Daniel A. Farber, Legislative Constitutionalism in a System of Judicial Supremacy, in THE LEAST
EXAMINED BRANCH 436 (Richard W. Bauman & Tsvi Kahana, eds. 2006).
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See id. at 443; Mark Tushnet, Non-Judicial Review, 40 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 453 (2003).
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See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (discussing justifications for and applications of political
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Katyal, supra note 161.
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legislative approval.164 Each of these mechanisms is inferior to soft statutes as a way of
advancing legislative views about constitutional law. Unlike the first two, the concurrent
resolution requires the support of a majority of Congress and thus presumptively
expresses the view of Congress as a whole. Unlike the third, the resolution need not be
influenced by the President’s view.
One might argue that only hard statutes should be valued in constitutional
interpretation. The case for relying on hard statutes is that when the legislature and the
President agree, their agreement is more likely to reflect a constitutional norm, than when
they do not agree. As constraints on regular politics, constitutional norms are typically
thought to require a public consensus, and the implicit supermajoritarianism of the
legislature-and-the-President could be better evidence of such a consensus.
But the hard statute approach has defects as well. One problem is that when a bill
is not enacted because legislators harbor constitutional concerns, reliable evidence of
their constitutional views may be difficult to identify. A committee report might claim
that the bill is unconstitutional,165 or the Congressional Record might contain
pronouncements to that effect. However, because there are dozens of reasons that a bill
fails to pass, fragments of the legislative history of an unenacted bill are a hazardous way
to advance a coherent body of constitutional law. Those who thought the bill
constitutional will later claim that the bill had nothing to do with the constitutional
dispute. There will be no reliable way to evaluate these claims.
In addition, if a hard statute is the only legislative vehicle for articulating
constitutional views, some statements will not be produced because of an anticipated
Presidential veto, even when Congress thinks the statute constitutionally unproblematic.
Especially when a particular bill has implications for the constitutional roles of Congress
and the President, Congress and the President might have good-faith disagreement about
the relevant constitutional norms. The President may veto statutes that violate his
interpretation of his constitutional powers, in which case Congress’s opposing
interpretation will not have a formal public airing. In this case, the legislature alone must
advance its interpretation of the Constitution; the legislature-and-the-President can only
advance a consensus interpretation.166 Exclusive reliance on hard statutes will produce a
body of constitutional law that is biased and incomplete.
In both cases, the soft statue is a better vehicle for legislative constitutional
interpretation. Congressional majorities would indicate that they do not proceed with a
proposed hard statute because they believe that it is unconstitutional. This judgment
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That is, if Congress passes a statute of dubious constitutionality, the fact of enactment should be taken as
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Interpretation, in THE LEAST EXAMINED BRANCH, supra note 157, at 355. In the same volume, Farber lists
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some Presidential powers, drawing on Justice Jackson’s Youngstown concurrence).
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would produce legislative precedent. Congress’s constitutional views would have a
formal venue akin to the Presidential signing statement, and courts would know where to
look for the legislature’s interpretation of the Constitution.167 Courts might or might not
give much weight to these statements, again, depending on their theory about the role of
the legislature in determining constitutional meaning. Much would also depend on
traditional indications of credibility: whether both houses or just one passed the
resolution and the extent of the majority; and whether the interpretation has been
advanced consistently by a succession of Congresses over time168 or for the first time;
and so forth. The advantage of soft statutes over committee reports or hearings is clear as
well. The majoritarian nature of soft statutes makes them more credible than committee
reports or hearings; soft statutes are more reliable (for courts and the public) indicators of
legislative views.169 In addition, soft statutes would give Congress the best chance to
develop an institutional position on its constitutional role, one that could compete
effectively with the executive’s longstanding position on executive power, which has
gained authority because it has been maintained across successive presidencies.
Both state and federal legislatures sometimes use resolutions in this way. For
example, in 1873 the Missouri legislature adopted a resolution expressing “grave doubts”
about the constitutionality of a hard statute.170 The Mississippi legislature used a
concurrent resolution to condemn the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Brown.171 In the
current U.S. Congress, a concurrent resolution was introduced “expressing the sense of
Congress that the Supreme Court misinterpreted the First Amendment to the Constitution
in the case of Buckley v. Valeo.172 Another House resolution stated that federal judges
should not treat foreign law as a source of authority for interpreting U.S. constitutional
law.173 As we saw earlier, Congress used a concurrent resolution to disagree on
constitutional grounds with a Presidential signing statement that interpreted a statute to
permit the executive branch to inspect sealed domestic mail.174 Congress has also used
resolutions to express views on the meaning of the Second Amendment,175 the First
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Amendment,176 federalism,177 apportionment,178 Supreme Court decisions,179 executive
authority,180 and the scope of federal powers.181
Congress could probably use soft statutes in a more effective way than it has so
far. Consider the longstanding dispute between the executive branch and the Senate over
the proper role of Senate “ratification history” for the interpretation of a treaty. The
executive branch believes that statements in committee reports, debates, and hearings in
the Senate should have little weight in interpretations of treaties;182 the Senate disagrees.
The Senate’s view was awkwardly attached to its advice and consent to a particular treaty
as a condition.183 The President ratified the treaty while expressing disagreement with the
Senate’s view.184 In essence, the Senate used a resolution-like mechanism to advance its
interpretation of its constitutional authority, one that courts can then consider when
deciding how to use Senate ratification history in order to interpret a treaty. Because the
President and the Senate disagreed about the relevant constitutional norm, the hard176

See H. Con. Res. 35, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (introduced Jan. 27, 1989) (“public desecration of the United
States flag is not considered symbolic speech under the first amendment to the Constitution”); H. Con. Res.
294, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (introduced Sept. 22, 1994) (Department of Housing and Urban Development
should not interfere with exercise of free speech rights); H. Con. Res. 199, 106th Cong., 1st Sess.
(introduced Oct. 19, 1999) (prayers at public schools and sporting events “are constitutional under the First
Amendment to the Constitution”); H. Con. Res. 428, 107th Cong, 2d Sess. (introduced June 26, 2002)
(recitation of pledge of allegiance in public schools is constitutional under the First Amendment); H. Con.
Res. 194, 109th Cong., 1st Sess. (introduced June 28, 2005) (display of 10 Commandments in public
buildings does not violate the first amendment to the Constitution of the United States).
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is in the interest of a viable Federal system of Government that primary regulatory authority over alcohol
beverages within their borders shall remain with the states”); 105 H. Con. Res. 299, 105th Cong., 2d Sess.
(introduced July 16, 1998) (specifying criteria for executive departments to follow when preempting state
law consistent with the Constitution).
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illegal aliens should not be counted in the 1990 decennial census for purposes of Congressional
reapportionment”).
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denied freedom of speech” in response to Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991)).
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Constitution, and any exercise of such Executive power inconsistent with the Constitution shall be of no
legal force or effect”); H. Con. Res. 368, 107th Cong., 2d Sess. (introduced March 20, 2002) (sense of
Congress that compulsory military service would be “violative of the individual liberties protected by the
Constitution”).
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statute (or hard-treaty) approach to legislative involvement in constitutional interpretation
could not be used.
In sum, soft statutes will generally be a superior mechanism for expressing
legislative interpretations of the constitution than committee hearings, floor speeches,
confirmation hearings, committee reports, hard statutes, or the failure to enact hard
statutes. Depending on one’s view of judicial review, soft statutes that express Congress’s
constitutional views might be dispositive or merely evidentiary, but regardless they
constitute a clear improvement over other vehicles for constitutional interpretation in the
legislature.
C. Constitutional Law of Soft Statutes
We have advocated greater use of soft statutes by Congress and greater reliance
on soft statues by courts. Are there potential constitutional obstacles to elevating the role
of soft statutes in the United States? In the past fifty years the Supreme Court has often
proved wary of legislative innovations, including the legislative veto,185 the line item
veto,186 and other policy-making regimes that blur the boundaries between law making
and law implementing by the legislative and executive branch. To the extent that soft
statutes could be used for some similar ends, does the constitution impose a bar?
The most prominent constitutional requirement concerning soft statutes is the
murky doctrine surrounding the Orders, Resolutions, and Votes Clause.187 The “residual
presentment” clause requires that:
Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate and
House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of
Adjournment) shall be presented to the President of the United States; and before
the Same shall take Effect, shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by
him, shall be repassed by two thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives,
according to the Rules and Limitations prescribed in the Case of a Bill.188
The conventional wisdom about this provision is that it ensures Congress cannot avoid
the Presentment requirement of Article I, Section 7, Clause 2, simply by labeling a
proposed law a “resolution” or enacting proposed legislation as a “vote” rather than a
“bill.”189 Indeed, in the early Congresses, proposals were labeled “bills” and “resolutions”
185

I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
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Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998).

187

U.S. Const. Art. I, Sec. 7, cl. 3. See generally Seth Barrett Tillman, A Textualist Defense of Article I,
Section 7, Clause 3: Why Hollingsworth v. Virginia Was Rightly Decided, and Why INS v. Chadha was
Wrongly Decided, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1265 (2005) (providing an exhaustive review of history and debate
surrounding the residual presentment clause).
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See I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 946-47 (1983). (“Presentment to the President and the Presidential
veto were considered so imperative that the draftsmen took special pains to assure that these requirements
could not be circumvented. During the final debate on Art. I, § 7, cl. 2, James Madison expressed concern
that it might easily be evaded by the simple expedient of calling a proposed law a ‘resolution’ or ‘vote’
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almost interchangeably. Anticipating this practice, the clause was arguably intended to
close a loophole in the requirement for presentment. Although there has been some
dissent from this view,190 the clause has not garnered sustained attention for several
decades.191
On its face, the clause might be taken to require presentment for all orders, votes,
or resolutions, except relating to adjournment. Modern judicial understanding is
otherwise. Proposed constitutional amendments passed by 2/3 majorities need not be
presented to the President.192 Early congressional practice used concurrent resolutions
and joint resolutions interchangeably, but by the late 1800s, Congress sought to
distinguish a class of concurrent resolutions that must be presented to the President from
the class that need not be.193 In 1897, the Senate Judiciary committee argued that a
concurrent resolution must be presented to the President only if it is “properly to be
regarded as legislative in its character and effect.”194 Views of the House were largely the
same. Proposals that are legislative in purpose or effect must be presented; proposals that
are not, need not.195 The practice of presenting all resolutions to the President has been
abandoned for more than a century, apparently on the theory that the resolution is not a
“legislative act.196 This view was summarized by the Supreme Court in Bowsher v.
Synar.197
A concurrent resolution, in contrast, makes no binding policy; it is “a means of
expressing fact, principles, opinions, and purposes of the two Houses,” Jefferson's
Manual and Rules of the House of Representatives 176 (1983), and thus does not
need to be presented to the President. It is settled, however, that if a resolution is
intended to make policy that will bind the Nation and thus is “legislative in its
character and effect,” S. Rep. No. 1335, 54th Cong., 2d Sess., 8 (1897) then the
full Article I requirements must be observed. For “the nature or substance of the
resolution, and not its form, controls the question of its disposition.” Ibid.198
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As an aside, note that the Supreme Court’s reliance on the 1897 Senate Report as a
source for its own judgment about constitutional meaning is further evidence of the
relevance of legislative views about the constitution to the courts. The case for giving
weight to the report would be all the stronger had the report been affirmatively voted on
by both houses of congress, resulting in a soft statute interpreting the Orders, Resolutions,
and Votes Clause.199
This clause has been interpreted to require presentment only for “legislative acts,”
which are best taken to mean acts imposing binding legal obligations. Because soft
statues do not impose binding obligations, the clause does not require presentment. Still,
we have argued that soft statutes will often induce behavioral changes, and perhaps any
legislative pronouncement that produces such effects should be deemed legislative and if
it is an “order, vote or resolution” must be presented to the President. This reading is
textually plausible, but it would be inconsistent with more than 100 years of actual
congressional practice and Supreme Court pronouncements on the matter. Given that
requirement of presentment would eliminate the advantages of soft statutes, requiring
presentment of all soft statutes seems an unwise deviation from the existing doctrine.
Nor would relying on soft statutes run afoul of other limitations on congressional
powers. A straightforward argument is that congressional power to rely on soft statutes
for purposes of statutory or constitutional interpretation is necessary and proper to the
execution of other legislative powers. Having the power to clarify the meaning of earlier
hard statutes would allow Congress to legislate at lower cost and with greater
precision.200 Indeed, if judges refuse to give weight to soft statutes in statutory
interpretation (not constitutional interpretation), the Constitution arguably permits
Congress to pass a hard statute directing courts to do so.201 Others have proposed
enacting a general statute that specifies interpretive principles for judges to apply in
statutory interpretation.202 A more modest proposal would direct or request that courts
give weight to soft statutes when interpreting another hard statute.
V. A GENERAL THEORY OF SOFT LAW
A. Law as Communication Generalized
We can generalize our discussion. Consider an agent that has law-making powers.
The agent could be a legislature, a common law court, an administrative agency, a
government that participates in international law-making, or a similar entity.
Authoritative documents such as written constitutions, and unwritten customs, set the
rules that determine when the agent’s communications are taken to be law and when they
are not taken to be law. When the agent complies with the rules, then other agents—
typically, those with executive power—will treat the communication as law, and act in
199
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conformity with it. They will arrest people who break the rules, or enforce civil damage
judgments. The public will react accordingly.
When the law-making agent does not comply with the rules, its communications
will not be treated as law. Executive officials will not arrest or otherwise sanction people
whose behavior is inconsistent with the policy judgment reflected in the communication.
However, the public (and other political agents) will often react as though the
communication were in fact law, as we have argued. The public might bring its behavior
into conformity with the policy goals expressed in the communication because (for
example) it predicts that later the law-making agent or some other law-making agent will
convert the communication into law, or because the pronouncement is a focal point for
behavior. As behavior changes, it may become easier for the original law-making agent
to enact a hard-law version of the soft law, or for some other law-making agent (such as a
court) to convert the soft law into hard law.
A hypothesis follows from this analysis. All else equal, the relative importance of
soft law to hard law—at the risk of spurious precision, we might say the ratio of soft law
to hard law—will rise as the formalities for creating hard law become stricter. This
hypothesis explains the high soft law content of international law, where hard law
requires the consent of all affected states; and of the common law, where hard law can be
generated only in response to a justiciable dispute; and of constitutional law in the United
States, where hard law can be created only through the strict Article V process or in
response to justiciable disputes. Our topic—statutory law—is the one where hard law is
easiest to create; but as we have seen, it is hard enough to create that various soft law
substitutes—concurrent resolutions, hortatory statutes, signing statements—have
emerged. One might also predict that soft law will become popular in periods of
uncertainty, where law-making agents might seek to test the waters of public opinion
before committing itself to a hard-law enactment.
In many cases, there is nothing troubling about soft law even though it has real
effects on people’s behavior. One can think of it as a useful regulatory instrument that
allows governments to obtain policy goals without resorting to law, which is sometimes
too costly, crude, and inflexible. But in other cases, resort to soft law may be troubling.
Some people are better at perceiving soft law than others; the latter group will often find
themselves in a worse position to control their lives. However, much of this argument
turns on current expectations about hard and soft law. If people come to expect that soft
law will function as a substitute for hard law, then they will endeavor to identify soft
public law in the same way they do hard public law. Soft statutes are recorded alongside
hard statutes; identifying the content of concurrent resolutions is no easier or harder than
identifying the content of hard resolutions.
B. Dicta
American judicial opinions contrast with those in many other countries, where
only a holding is stated, or sometimes a formulaic statement of the reasoning that sheds
no light on the real basis of the holding. American opinions overflow with reasoning that
has no legally binding effect—dicta. The dictum is a type of soft law because it is a form
of communication from a law-making body (a court) that an audience will take as
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guidance because it anticipates that future courts (as well as legislatures) may convert
that soft law into hard law.
The advantages of dicta are well-known. Litigants who know the reasons for the
holding as well as the holding itself can better predict how courts will react in similar but
not identical cases, and they can plan their behavior accordingly. As in our example of
Congress, courts can, in dicta, express their general views without committing themselves
to them. This may provide a desirable balancing of two opposing virtues: settling the law
so that people can plan their behavior, and leaving the law open so that it can be
determined on the basis of better information as conditions change over time. Note how
dicta blur the traditional distinction between prospective (and binding) legislation and
retrospective (and binding) judicial interpretation: it is a form of prospective but
nonbinding legislation.
Judges, unlike legislators, do not have the option to issue “binding” dicta in the
form of prospective laws, though sometimes judges will purport to summarize previous
holdings as a binding rule of precedent. Nonetheless, precedent is always vulnerable to
narrowing as litigants persuade judges that the reasons behind the precedent do not apply
in their case. So the dictum, if skillfully employed, just seems like a useful way for
judges to give hints about the potential future path of the law—and this additional
information will always benefit the public (although it will benefit those who have
sophisticated legal advice more than those who do not).
There is, however, a danger from dicta, which our analysis brings clearly into
view. To the extent that the public adjusts its behavior in light of dicta, the felt need for
legislation over the relevant issue may diminish. That is to say, judges can use dicta to
legislate, impinging on the legislature’s prerogatives. If legislatures are generally better at
legislating than courts are, and surely this is usually the case, then dicta might crowd out
good legislation. To be sure, if the public predicts a legislative reaction, then it will not be
as heavily influenced by dicta. How these forces play out in any specific context is a
difficult question. Virtually everyone agrees that it is better to have a mix of binding
precedent and nonbinding dicta in judicial opinions.
C. Constitutional Law
At one time, one might have argued that hard constitutional law would comprise
only the original text and amendments issued under Article V. However, it has long been
clear that federal courts have the authority to recognize new constitutional rights. Courts
have hard-law authority to issue binding interpretations of the U.S. Constitution when—
and here is the main formality—a justiciable dispute arises, and the Constitution develops
as precedents accumulate.203 The formalities that distinguish hard constitutional law and
soft constitutional law are essentially those of justiciability. When courts refuse to settle
conflicting constitutional positions, and the Article V hurdle is too high, soft law is the
only mechanism for constitutional development.
The modern soft-law analogue in constitutional development is thus the set of
constitutional rules and norms that have emerged outside the judicial and Article V
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process.204 Presidents make claims about executive power, embodied in veto messages,
signing statements, speeches, briefs, and messages to Congress.205 Congress makes
opposing claims in resolutions, committee reports, speeches, regular hard law, and other
documents. Usually courts refrain from resolving disputes between the President and
Congress over the scope of executive and legislative power, and so non-judicial
precedents ultimately determine how these powers are allocated.
The enormous soft law component of the separation of powers is likely due to the
courts’ failure to intervene, plus the difficulty of amending the Constitution. If the
Constitution were easier to amend, it may be that Presidential powers would have been
formally adjusted as circumstances changed. Instead, the real constitutional allocation of
authority is ambiguous, contested, and perhaps unstable. The public can only make rough
predictions about whether the President’s or Congress’s views will prevail when
conditions force a decision and the President and Congress disagree about what to do.
That is when a constitutional crisis arises, and paralysis can ensue.206
Still, whether we would be better off with a “harder” Constitution than the one we
have is a difficult question. As we have seen, the advantage of soft law is that it is cheap
to change, and so can be changed easily as conditions change. What does seem to be clear
is that courts and the public should pay attention to the constitutional views of the
executive branch and the legislature, and those institutions should use the means at their
disposal to make their views known.
In other constitutions, soft law has been institutionalized. For example, the Indian
Constitution establishes directive principles that “shall not be enforced by any court, but
… are nevertheless fundamental in the governance of the country and it shall be the duty
of the State to apply these principles in making laws.”207 These principles incorporate
positive rights to health care, a fair distribution of wealth, education, and so forth.208 Like
other forms of soft law, they are communications—here from the founders of the modern
Indian State—that express their vision of the overall ambition of that state, one that could
well have influenced the subsequent quasi-socialist path of Indian development. Not
surprisingly, the soft law has, to some extent, hardened. The Supreme Court of India has
drawn on the directive principles as interpretive guidance, and these principles have thus
made their way into India’s hard constitutional law.209
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D. International Law
International law has faced a similar problem. Under conventional doctrine, states
create international law mainly by entering treaties, which require the consent of all treaty
parties. This system works well enough when two or a small number of states are
involved. But many international problems have global scope, and can be solved only if
all or nearly all states participate. Examples include the problem of maintaining peace,
global environmental problems such as climate change, human rights atrocities, and the
depletion of fisheries. States seeking to solve these problems cannot always persuade
other states to consent to an appropriate treaty regime, and so such a treaty regime cannot
come into existence.
The formality required to create international law—essentially, unanimous
consent—is far stricter than the formalities required to amend the U.S. Constitution, and
as a result international law is even harder to create. But just as political agents in the
United States work around the amendment rules by creating soft constitutional law, so do
states work around the international law rules by creating soft international law. States
enter nonbinding agreements, hoping that they will help bring into existence a political
consensus for binding agreements, or that they will provide a framework for informal
cooperation that may later advance. Notable examples include the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights and the Basle Accords. The Universal Declaration set the stage for
subsequent hard-law treaties such as the International Covenant for Civil and Political
Rights,210 while the Basle Accords, despite their soft-law status, led directly to
cooperation between the central banks of different states.211 In addition, states
increasingly recognize a new type of customary international law, which is not rigidly
tied to state practice and hence clear evidence of state consent.212 Many scholars believe
that states eventually come round and start complying with this type of soft law, at which
point it “hardens” into conventional customary international law.213 Others do not, and
worry that violation of soft-law norms will weaken incentives to comply with hard
international law.214 In both the treaty and customary international law cases, we see the
international-law analogies to two of our public law arguments: that soft law can
anticipate hard law and that soft law can directly change behavior by supplying
information about the goals of lawmakers.
The ubiquity of soft international law is due to the absence of an authoritative
interpreter that takes care to distinguish communications that comply with formalities and
those that do not. States comply with soft law when they have an interest in cooperating,
just as they do for hard law.215 At the other extreme, ordinary domestic legal regulation
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has greater hard-law content; the reason is that the authority to create, interpret, and
enforce domestic law is more settled. Individuals take hard law seriously because they
expect that it will be enforced; soft law therefore has a residual role, mainly that of
providing information about the possible future path of hard law. In between,
constitutional law has substantial hard law content where courts have successfully
asserted themselves as the authoritative interpreters of constitutional law, and not where
they have refrained from doing so—chiefly, as we have noted, separation of powers and
political questions. The executive and legislative branches cooperate when they can,
generating soft law norms in the process. Otherwise, they defer to the hard law
constitutional norms generated by the courts or work around their conflicting legal
positions.
CONCLUSION
It is easy to dismiss soft law as inconsequential. When lawmaking authorities
create laws that by their own terms or common understanding have no effect, one
immediately suspects a cynical public-relations ploy. The international lawyer Hersch
Lauterpacht said that states agreed to the terms of the Universal Declaration only because
they would not be bound by them.216 As we saw above, critics of hortatory laws assume
that they are designed to mislead the public, so that Congress wins credit without having
to raise taxes or regulate powerful interest groups.217 Yet no one makes the similar claim
about the private law analogue—non-enforceable letters of intent that set the stage for
negotiations that will culminate in a binding agreement, or non-enforceable contracts that
provide a basis for cooperation but no appeal to the courts. Soft public law has similar
desirable properties, as we have shown.
Agents may demand soft law because the formalities for creating hard law are
strict, and so prevent legislation that the agents seek. Sometimes, soft law provides a
second best solution: agents would prefer hard law but can only obtain soft law, which
allows for some cooperation but less than hard law would. But soft law can also be a
first-best way of affecting behavior. Soft law avoids unwanted consequences of the use of
hard law, such as the involvement of other agents (for example, judges or the President).
In the domestic context, political agents who use soft law might fear that judges do not
understand their interests and the nature of their cooperation; or they might fear that
judges will protect interests that they wish to ignore. In either case, from the perspective
of the political agents, soft law is not a second best, but is simply an alternative
regulatory instrument that has advantages that formal legislation lacks.
We have provided theoretical reasons for believing that soft statutes affect
behavior, and some anecdotal evidence. We have identified several categories of
behavior where soft statutes are likely to be important: where expression of the sense of
Congress can help parties adjust to future hard legislation; can provide an independent
basis of cooperation by revealing Congress’s view of the world; and can enable Congress
216
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to stake out its congressional authority vis-à-vis the President and other constitutional
agents when the judiciary declines to intervene. These activities have implications for
statutory interpretation and constitutional adjudication, though precisely how courts
should take account of soft statutes depends on contested theories of statutory
interpretation and constitutional development.
We have only scratched the surface of a difficult topic, and we conclude by
identifying subjects for further research. One question concerns the conditions under
which soft law becomes hard law. In international law, a general view is that soft law
tends to harden: states eventually incorporate it in treaties or it enters customary
international law. The Universal Declaration illustrates both these paths. In domestic
constitutional law, this sometimes happens—when the Supreme Court recognizes a
political norm as a constitutional norm, for example, the 1897 Senate’s understanding of
the Orders, Votes, and Resolutions clause that was ultimately approved by the Supreme
Court.218 But soft law often seems to exist in parallel (and in tension) with hard law.
People who do not like soft constitutional norms appeal back to the written Constitution.
International lawyers fear that soft international law will weaken the legitimacy of hard
international law.219
Another question concerns whether hard law might crowd out soft law, in a
harmful (or beneficial) way. In the social norms literature, this possibility is a recurrent
theme. Scholars often argue that legal norms might injure social norms without fully
replacing them, so that people find it harder to cooperate despite well-intended legal
intervention.220 In the legislative and agency context, the concern seems to be the
opposite—that congressional resolutions or agency guidance statements might crowd out
formal legislation and regulation, because they are easier to enact. In the agency context,
critics worry that the informal approach reduces public input and inappropriately lowers
the costs of agency action. In the legislative context, one might worry that Congress can
use soft law to obtain ends that would otherwise contravene constitutional limits.
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